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Introduction
A New Wave of Democratic Character

Digital technology has cultivated currents of connectivity and democratization that
comprise a new wave of character—one that nonetheless emerges from the winds of past ideals
of social progress and political equality. The transcendence of our communicative reach now
offers us the promise of emancipation from our environments. During a pandemic that entraps us
in physical vulnerabilities and limitations, the crest of our culture crashes down only to
regenerate through a successive surge: our reliance on the already ascending digital domain.
Although I complete this paper through such modern means, this endeavor derives its inspiration
from old observations.
The growth of digital technology increases our natural freedom: our ability to act amidst
the constraints of our surroundings.1 But proper education is necessary to promote political
freedom: our capacity to self-govern. French political theorists Jean-Jacques Rousseau and
Alexis de Tocqueville knew this well. Against the backdrop of advancing Enlightenment
ideology, Rousseau writes of vanity as the source of contemporary misery. Yet he presents the
possibility that we may shape our drive for validation into the glue that holds together democracy
through recognition of our common inclinations. Following the American and French
revolutions, Tocqueville writes that a rise in individualism may introduce a subtle but corrosive
form of democratic despotism. Yet he argues that associations can prevent this danger and grant
us greater autonomy by encouraging us to reflect on our self-interest well understood: the greater
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “On the Social Contract, ” in The Major Political Writings of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau: The Two Discourses & The Social Contract, translated and edited by John T. Scott (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2012).
1
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perspective we gain through collaboration with others, thoughtful reflection, and reverence for
truths that lie beyond the dictates of our cursory instincts.2
Although Rousseau and Tocqueville present divergent approaches to the project of
self-governance, they both contribute to a common reservoir from which we can gain insight into
the political trends of the Digital Age. Both Rousseau and Tocqueville claim that the dogmas of
their day, Enlightenment ideology and democratic ideology respectively, present paths that lead
us away from political freedom. Today, I extend their analyses to examine how faith in the
emancipatory power of digital technology may similarly alienate us from our ability to
self-govern.
The progression of my account will mirror Rousseau’s model of education for political
freedom. For Rousseau, the ideal process of political education is twofold. First, in natural
education, one learns self-reliance through free inquiry without the socially-imposed restrictions
of one’s drive for recognition. Second, in civic education, one learns to direct the eventual
emergence of one’s drive for recognition toward a sense of duty to support the general will: the
set of fundamental desires that belong to each of the members of a political community and
uphold “the happiness and freedom of all our fellow beings.”3 Although Rousseau considered
such efforts difficult in his day, the Digital Age has perhaps further problematized the education
of self-governance.
Now, we are embodied in both the physical world and the digital realm. Our increased
social visibility allows for the intrusion of vanity into our private existences, as we perpetually

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated, edited, and with an introduction by Harvey C.
Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000).
2

Frederick Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love: E
 vil, Rationality, and the Drive for Recognition
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 51.
3
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appear before an audience. Meanwhile, digital distortions of reality provide escapist
entertainment and factionalized news that may direct our attention away from public engagement
as we withdraw into individualism. Consequently, modern technology may actualize Rousseau’s
depiction of the depraved products of “the education of society”: “double men, always appearing
to relate everything to others and never relating anything except to themselves alone.”4
Digital society’s education of democratic citizens occurs in chambers of reflection. At
their worst, these chambers function as screens that present us with illusory insight into the
outside world while entrapping us in our pride and bias. But at their best, our digital chambers
serve as assemblies that encourage the exercise of civil freedom: one’s capacity to orient oneself
“toward a whole of which one is a part.”5 To navigate these contrary paths, we would do well to
envision what the road away from political freedom looks like so that we can avoid it and instead
align technological progress with the project of self-government.
In this paper, I aim to provide some such understanding. I argue that Rousseau’s account
of our corrupted drive for recognition and Tocqueville’s investigation into the dangers of
individualism apply all the more to democracy in the Digital Age. Accordingly, these character
critiques can help us understand how technological progress may deviate from the promotion of
political freedom.
In Chapter One, “To Hold a Mirror to Nature,” I examine the purpose of Rousseau’s
account of the state of nature. I argue that he places us back in nature in order to reflect the pitfall
of our faith in social progress—an aggravated drive for recognition that intensifies as

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, introduction, translation, and notes by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic
Books, 1979), 41.
4
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “On the Social Contract, ” in Major Political Writings, 174.
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Enlightenment ideology encourages man to aim to understand the world in his own image rather
than to understand himself within the constraints of nature.
In Chapter Two, “The Actualization of Double Man,” I analyze the formation of the
Rousseauian double man in digital society. I argue that the increasing divide between the digital
selves we appear as and the natural selves we inhabit may lead to a form of self-estrangement
that encourages us to view ourselves and others as objects—instruments that support our sense of
prideful self-awareness.
In Chapter Three, “Recognition through Social Surveillance,” I explain how our inflamed
drive for validation causes us to subject ourselves to social surveillance. Rather than
predominantly perform for peers whose feedback and interests could encourage our self-interest
well understood, we increasingly submit to the amorphous audience of public opinion and the
data collection of Big Tech companies.
In Chapter Four, “Individualism through Personalization Technology,” I show that
personalization technology allows for further withdrawal into Tocquevillian individualism.
Online, democratic ideology may aggravate the power of public opinion to chill free speech
while algorithmic distribution of targeted news shapes our digital environments into chambers
that reflect our particular biases and desires.
In my conclusion, “Digital Tribalism and the Automation of Self-Growth,” I identify the
potential path of digital progress that departs from political freedom. The evolution of
technology threatens to produce a regression in the sociability and reflective agency that promote
our capacity for self-government. But by better recognizing this danger, we may reconstruct
digital dis-society into conditions more conducive to self-growth and flourishing.

4

Chapter One
To Hold A Mirror to Nature

Suit the action to the word, the word to the action; with this special observance, that you
o’erstep not the modesty of nature: for anything so overdone is from the purpose of
playing, whose end, both at the first and now, was and is, to hold, as ’twere, the mirror up
to nature; to show virtue her own image, scorn her own image, and the very age and body
of the time his form and pressure. Now, this overdone, or come tardy off, though it make
the unskilful laugh, cannot but make the judicious grieve; the censure of the which one
must in your allowance, o’erweigh a whole theatre of others.
—Shakespeare, Hamlet 3.2
Shakespeare’s Prince Hamlet delivers these words to actors who will soon perform for
young Hamlet’s stepfather, King Claudius of Denmark. Hamlet urges the players to appear
artistic rather than artificial and to act not only for the sake of entertainment but also to reveal a
truth, for they are to depict a thinly veiled reenactment of the crime Hamlet suspects Claudius of
having committed: the murder of Hamlet’s father, the former king. The actors are to hold a
“mirror up to nature” so that Claudius will be confronted by his possible past, and Hamlet can
decipher whether or not Claudius is a killer.6
For Rousseau, the distinctive quality of humans is this very ability to hold the mirror, to
reenact the past in order to better understand who we are and to attain a view of ourselves
through our self-awareness. We possess the faculty of perfectibility, w
 hich allows us to envision
an improved version of ourselves and strive to satisfy that dream.7 Thus, when Rousseau first
describes man in the state of nature, man’s attention at once directs toward nature as it is and

William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark (Minneapolis: Lerner Publishing Group, 1985), 80,
https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.bowdoin.edu/lib/bowdoin-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5445133.
6
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Rousseau, “Discourse on Inequality, ” in Major Political Writings.
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reflects toward heaven as it could be. Rousseau presents his model human as “walking on two
feet, using his hands as we do ours, directing his gaze toward the whole of nature, and surveying
with his eyes the vast expanse of heaven.”8
Like Hamlet, Rousseau displays his mirror to nature to reveal sin. Yet the wrongdoing
that Rousseau wishes to expose emanates not from a single actor but rather from the propensity
of social progress to make actors of us all. Rousseau might agree with another one of
Shakespeare’s characters that “all the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely
players,” but, for Rousseau, such social superficiality is not a predetermined feature of human
interaction.9 Instead, our prideful posturing marks a cultural distortion of our drive for
recognition. We bear our self-awareness as a burden when we no longer hold a mirror to nature
but rather use the reflection of our self-awareness to cast everything back to our social rank.
Inequality and suffering follow from our increasing tendency to sacrifice our humanity for the
sake of social roles themselves, as Claudius does when he kills his brother to rise to the position
of King of Denmark. Rousseau offers an account of the state of nature not to provide a literal (or
even necessarily linear) history but rather to hold a mirror to nature, to show how we become
entranced by our reflection rather than realize it to be a mere means, and to reveal how we can
keep from instrumentalizing ourselves for the sake of our self-image.

8

Rousseau, “Discourse on Inequality, ” in Major Political Writings, 65.

William Shakespeare, As You Like It ( Infomotions, Inc., 2000), 27,
https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.bowdoin.edu/lib/bowdoin-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3314851.
9
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Reconstructing the State of Nature: A Source of Self-Understanding
Rousseau sets the stage for his account of human nature by examining what separates
humans from other animals: our very lack o f a fixed nature. Our most enduring trait is our ability
to adapt to the new cultures and technologies that we construct and inherit. Here, Rousseau’s
depiction departs from those of previous social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and
John Locke. As political theorist John T. Scott notes, unlike “perhaps all of his predecessors,”
Rousseau holds that human nature is “shaped to a great extent by historical, environmental, and
social forces instead of having a universal and unvarying form.”10 Human history results not only
from the external environment of the natural world but also from our perfectibility, which
receives its drive from our will to change nature, including our own. Accordingly, Rousseau
writes that humans “raise themselves up to the level of the instinct of beasts, with the advantage
that each species has only its own instinct, and man—perhaps having none that belongs to
him—appropriates them all to himself.”11 The crucial question that concerns Rousseau is what
we do with the mechanisms we appropriate, particularly as we build technologies that appear
increasingly foreign from any organic existence apart from human culture.
Rousseau holds that humans are unique creatures not only because we acquire new
abilities but also because we develop new desires. The ends at which our actions aim shift as our
social setting shapes the manner of our self-love. On Rousseau’s account, humans in their state
of nature seek only to fulfill amour de soi, which Scott describes as “the natural form of self-love
by which all beings, including human beings, seek their self-preservation and well-being.”12

10

Rousseau, “Introduction,” in Major Political Writings, xiv.
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Rousseau, “Discourse on Inequality, ” in Major Political Writings, 66.
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Rousseau, “Introduction,” in Major Political Writings, xxxvi.
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People with this elemental mentality exhibit relatively solitary behavior and, without acquiring
superfluous wants, attend only to their needs.
Yet they can also recognize when another expresses a basic and universal will by
mirroring their natural desires. For Rousseau, our empathy predates our political existence, as
primordial man experiences “an innate repugnance to see his fellow human being suffer.”13
Rousseau regards this quality as the rudimentary instinct of pity and recognizes that even other
animals share this capacity. He writes that “an animal does not pass by a dead animal of its own
species without uneasiness.”14 Both non-human animals and humans in the state of nature wish
not to see or cause needless suffering. They only employ the violence or domination that their
amour de soi r equires.
Rousseau’s man in the state of nature follows no moral code beyond instinct. As
sociologist Emile Durkheim explains, “man is only a moral being because he lives in society,
since morality consists in solidarity with a group…. The state of nature… is if not immoral, at
least amoral, a fact that Rousseau himself recognized.”15 But man need not abide by a moral
code to act justly toward himself and others. Rousseau argues that ideology often contaminates
natural pity and politicizes our sense of justice. The politics we develop in sophisticated society
may do more to corrupt us than to civilize us. Thus, Rousseau claims of man in nascent society
relative to man in modern society, “so much more does the ignorance of vice profit these men

13

Rousseau, “Discourse on Inequality, ” in Major Political Writings, 83.
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Rousseau, “Discourse on Inequality, ” in Major Political Writings, 83.

Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, introduction by Lewis Coser, translated by W.D.
Halls (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 332.
15
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than does the understanding of virtue profit those.”16 Since man in the state of nature attends only
to his basic needs, he has very few passions. Passion and reason only develop together as humans
enter into society, and this linkage can cause us to construct narratives that conflate pride and
morality. Perhaps, as philosopher Sally J. Scholz suggests Rousseau’s view, “there is no need for
a ‘higher philosophy’; one need only consult one’s conscience to determine what is right and
what is wrong.”17 Nevertheless, humans are destined to complicate the tensions between their
self-interests as they enter society.
Individual humans in the state of nature eventually need to band together to promote their
collective amour de soi. Alone, man faces obstacles such as “the height of trees, which prevented
him from reaching their fruits, the competition of animals that sought to eat these fruits, [and] the
ferocity of those that wanted to take his life.”18 Population growth and environmental constraints
exacerbate these deficiencies and create the need for humans to socialize. Rousseau observes that
“in proportion as the human race spread, difficulties multiplied together with men.”19 And many
of these difficulties require collective action.
The interdependence of our amour de soi a nd common recognition of shared goals
creates society and, along with it, amour-propre, which philosopher Frederick Neuhouser defines
as the “form of self-love that drives human individuals to seek the esteem, approval, admiration,
or love—in short, the recognition—of their fellow beings.”20 Amour-propre expands our interests
16

Rousseau, “Discourse on Inequality, ” in Major Political Writings, 82.

Sally J. Scholz, “That All Children Should Be Free: Beauvoir, Rousseau, and Childhood,” Hypatia 25,
no. 2 (Spring 2010): 397, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2010.01102.x.
17
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Rousseau, “Discourse on Inequality, ” in Major Political Writings, 92.
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Rousseau, “Discourse on Inequality, ” in Major Political Writings, 92.

20

Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love, 1.
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beyond survival and basic well-being. It directs our concern toward a sense of our self-worth that
depends on how we imagine we appear to other members of society, or, in aggravated forms of
amour-propre, how we seem to what Hamlet calls a “whole theatre of others.”21
Hamlet acknowledges that concern over how we appear to this crowd can encourage us to
overstep “the modesty of nature” and, through prideful self-awareness, abuse our ability to
consider our worth in the eyes of others.22 For Rousseau, such exaggeration of amour-propre
poses the central problem of modern society. Accordingly, Neuhouser notes:
One of Rousseau’s central theses is that amour propre i n its corrupted
manifestations—pride or vanity—is the principal source of an array of evils so
widespread that they can easily appear to be necessary features of the human condition:
enslavement, conflict, vice, misery, and self-estrangement.23
Appropriately cultivated, however, amour-propre allows us “to hold… the mirror up to
nature” and “show virtue her own image.”24 As Neuhouser claims, mitigating the dangers of
corrupted amour-propre “ depends not on suppressing or overcoming the drive for recognition
but on cultivating it so that it contributes positively to the achievement of freedom, peace, virtue,
happiness, and unalienated selfhood.”25 Our social tendency to be influenced by how we wish to
be seen by others can, at its best, suggest a sense of duty that prompts beneficent self-assessment.
Concern for our social image can function as the better angel of our nature that delivers us from
the short-sightedness and errors in judgment that often render our self-governance ineffective.

21

Shakespeare, Hamlet, 80.

22

Shakespeare, Hamlet, 80.

23

Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love, back cover.
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Shakespeare, Hamlet, 80.
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Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love, back cover.
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Rousseau emphasizes that the most profoundly positive instances of amour-propre sprout
in intimate societies and, above all, in families. The state of nature in which humans engage in
close connections rather than thin relationships based on appearances marks the highest form of
sociability for Rousseau. He observes that “this period of the development of human faculties,
occupying a golden mean between the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of
our pride, must have been the happiest and most durable epoch.”26
Rousseau depicts the family as a fountainhead for self-governance that is at once simple
and far-sighted. Our thick relationships prompt a simple sense of positive pride, as our drive for
recognition therein is born from empathy and shared basic responsibilities. Yet these intimately
acquired interests are also far-sighted, as familial love creates a selfless drive for
self-affirmation—an imposition of the interests of others onto our own will such that our
self-interest extends beyond our lives and serves as a source for seamless adherence to
self-governance for the sake of our posterity. Perhaps this juxtaposition between bounded social
awareness and immortality is what elicits the Christian comparison that philosopher Maurice
Cranston draws between Rousseau’s supreme state of nature and the paradise that God creates
for humans. “‘Nascent society’,” Cranston writes, “is the period of human evolution which
Rousseau regards as almost ideal: it is the Garden of Eden in his vision of the past.”27 Rousseau
reminisces on the virtue of such times:
The first developments of the heart were the effect of a new situation that brought
together husbands and wives, fathers and children, in a common dwelling. The habit of
living together gave rise to the sweetest feelings known to men: conjugal love and
paternal love. Each family became a little society all the better united…. with a simple
26

Rousseau, “Discourse on Inequality, ” in Major Political Writings, 97.

Maurice Cranston, Philosophers and Pamphleteers: Political Theorists of the Enlightenment ( Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 72.
27
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and solitary life, very limited needs, and the implements they had invented to provide for
them.28
However, we ought not to interpret Rousseau’s approval of this age as a call to return to
our primeval naiveté. Rather, Rousseau’s account of human nature encourages us to prioritize the
relationships that enrich our lives, for they provide us with not only innate but also instrumental
value.

The Complication of Civic Education
Consideration for others within thick relationships establishes the basis for adopting the
interests of other members of society. Rousseau realizes that in large groups, it is unrealistic to
expect individuals to behave as members of one cohesive and caring clan. Accordingly, he
declares that “the most ancient of all societies and the only natural one is that of the family.”29
But Rousseau also highlights the role of the family as an intermediary between individuals and
governments—a bond through which we practice the transition from natural to civil freedom.
In Rousseau’s treatise on education, he teaches his pupil, Emile, virtue by compelling
Emile to learn from his affection for his lover, Sophie, how to transition from his natural to his
civic education. Rousseau demands that Emile leave Sophie temporarily so that Emile will feel
what it is like for his natural freedom to be subjected to law for the sake of the one he loves. As
philosopher Allan Bloom interprets, Emile’s “passion for his future wife and concern for their
unborn children, combined with his mature learning, make an abstract presentation of the

28

Rousseau, “Discourse on Inequality, ” in Major Political Writings, 94.
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Rousseau, “On the Social Contract, ” in Major Political Writings, 164.
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principles of right accessible to him…. He is, in effect, taught the Social Contract. ”30 For
Rousseau, obligations to those whose well-being is an extension of ours—to those whom we
know and love—comprise our most precious social connections and symbolize the way we
should try to engage with greater society.
Our personal attachments teach us political freedom by expanding our capacity to
self-govern. For when we truly care for another, we willingly subject our selfish interests to the
interests we share with our loved one. This is not the mark of sacrifice but rather the exercise of
civil freedom: one’s capacity to orient oneself “toward a whole of which one is a part.”31 The
emergence of amour-propre can t hus cultivate connection rather than promote the pursuit of
status-based domination. Accordingly, the formation of a monogamous romantic relationship
occupies an important place in Rousseau’s account of ideal education. Neuhouser elaborates:
The point of following Emile even after he has emerged from adolescence is that his
education is not complete until he has entered into a lifelong, monogamous, heterosexual
union based on his exclusive, passionate love for a particular woman, Sophie…. Beyond
simply functioning as a source of esteem in general, though, sexual love responds to the
specific desire to occupy ‘the first position’ in the eyes of others, which… Rousseau
regards as a deep and persistent yearning of human beings. The peculiar achievement of
romantic love is that, by taking a single person as its object, it transforms the general
desire to be first for others into the specific desire to be first for one other person. In
doing so, romantic love makes the longing to be first satisfiable in principle for everyone,
and so, from the perspective of society as a whole, its power to produce misery and
discord is significantly reduced, even if not eliminated altogether.32
Yet the negative effects of aggravated amour-propre cannot always be so easily quelled.
Rousseau characterizes this form of self-love as a “useful but dangerous instrument” that “rarely

30

Rousseau, “Introduction,” in Emile, 27.
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Rousseau, “On the Social Contract, ” in Major Political Writings, 174.
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Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love, 170.
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does good without evil.”33 Amour-propre can become destructive when our drive for recognition
deviates from our consideration of loved ones whose well-being functions as an end for the sake
of which we govern our actions. The approval we garner from our close family and friends is
closely tied to our empathic connections with them—our adoption of their interests as our own.
In this vein, our civil freedom arises from a socially conditioned sense of duty.
But the expansion of the size and technological sophistication of society encourages us to
sacrifice bonds based on intimacy for relations based on status. Our relationships thin as our
increased communicative capacity encourages relational breadth at the expense of relational
depth. Consequently, our ties more easily untether as they increasingly fail to instill in us the
adoption of the self-interests of others—the very exercise that promotes our civil freedom. This
failure marks the miseducation of modern man, as he extracts the aim of social approval from the
context of reciprocal consideration in which it is warranted. The contemporary character deviates
from the model of political education that Rousseau sets forth for Emile:
He [Emile] will not precisely say to himself, “I rejoice because they approve of me,” but
rather, “I rejoice because they approve of what I have done that is good. I rejoice that the
people who honor me do themselves honor. So long as they judge so soundly, it will be a
fine thing to obtain their esteem.”34
Rousseau observes that in a society based on status and immoderate amour-propre, we
increasingly seek approval from others without adopting their interests. We instrumentalize our
peers for the sake of the attention they grant us. We value their approval not because it marks a
mutual connection of interests but rather because it affirms our drive for recognition. We raise a
mirror to nature only so that it might reflect well upon us. For Rousseau, the construction of

33

Rousseau, Emile, 244-245.

34

Rousseau, Emile, 339.

14

social hierarchies that aim at the end of recognition itself marks our original sin and, in so doing,
provides the principal source of contemporary suffering as it renders our desires insatiable.
Herein lies Rousseau’s rationalization of the Fall. Our perfectibility allows us to adapt to
and manipulate our environments—to disobey the laws of nature. Yet when swept up by the
temptation of perfectibility as an end in itself, aside from the well-being it secures or the
relationships it promotes, we strive to become the gods we once feared. We wish to be
impossibly perfect. We construct as our self-representation the “vast expanse of heaven” against
which others measure themselves.35 We place ourselves at the center of the universe. But we do
so not to promote the virtuous end of heaven that encourages individuals to rise to their best
selves; rather, we do so merely to attract followers. Thus, the threat of social progress is that it
tempts us to make false idols of ourselves.
This reading becomes clearer when we place Rousseau’s analysis in historical context.
He wrote in an era of technological progress analogous to our day: an age similarly characterized
by the promise of greater connectivity through the reduction of the formerly spiritual into
mechanistic terms. Widespread publishing and increasing rates of literacy allowed the science,
rationalism, and secularization of the Enlightenment not only to alter the course of society but
also to inspire a new view of ourselves. Behind the currents of history, man began to see not God
but himself. Yet just as water bends light toward the center to create an inverse reflection, the
reflection of man as the ultimate creator is a backward one.
This backdrop of misguided faith in technological progress is the image of nature to
which Rousseau attempts to hold his mirror. For, if we can reflect on the inverted self-image of

35

Rousseau,“Discourse on Inequality, ” in Major Political Writings, 65.
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ourselves as false idols, we can correct our misleading views and capture an authentic
perspective of our place in nature.
Such an endeavor requires a study of the origins of our drive to chase the status-driven
social roles we construct. Rousseau first presents the effects of inflamed amour-propre as
hindrances that accompany our hubris—methods of subjugation disguised as the relishes of
sophisticated society— in his Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts. Then, in his Discourse on
Inequality, Rousseau argues that our aggravated drive for recognition is not inevitable but rather
arises from the cultural corruption of amour-propre. It is possible to change our course in order
to avoid this obstacle to political freedom. Accordingly, Rousseau offers us a uniquely
emancipatory path for social progress. His ultimate goal will be to expose the modern means of
false self-idolatry and propose the goal of becoming gods of ourselves rather than gods
ourselves.
The ultimate good at which society ought to aim, Rousseau suggests, is not to invent
objects but to reinvent ourselves through our capacity to self-govern. To fulfill this purpose, only
democracy will do. As Scott notes, Rousseau becomes the first, and perhaps the most notable,
political theorist in the Western canon to argue that democracy is the only legitimate form of
government.36 For democratic forms of government can, with proper education (as Rousseau
later offers in Emile) and institutions (as Rousseau presents in On the Social Contract), cultivate
civil freedom and support the general will, which is the ideal object of representation for the
social contract. 37

36
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Rousseau does not doubt that the advances of the Enlightenment present a potentially
liberating lane for learning self-government. Indeed, he begins his first major political work with
an optimistic outlook on our increased capacity for self-understanding. Rousseau writes:
It is a grand and beautiful spectacle to see man emerging, as it were, out of nothingness
through his own efforts; dissipating by the light of his reason the shadows in which
nature has enveloped him; rising above himself; soaring by his mind to the celestial
regions; traversing with the steps of a giant, like the sun, the vast expanse of the universe;
and, what is grander and more difficult, returning into himself in order there to study man
and to know his nature, his duties, and his end.38
Much of the rest of his writing in the Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts a nd beyond,
however, warns that we should also consider how, as we progress further away from our natural
state, our intensifying obsession with appearances threatens to produce injustice and prevent
self-government.

The Aggravation of Amour-Propre
Why, one might ask, have we not been content to cultivate our gardens in those intimate
societies that Rousseau values for their tendency to fashion the drive for recognition into loving
forms of civil freedom? “Why,” Cranston questions, “if the simple condition of ‘nascent society’
was so delightful, did men ever quit it?”39 He answers that within Rousseau’s account of the state
of nature, the answer may lie in “economic shortage”:
As the number of persons on earth increased, the natural abundance of provisions
diminished; no longer able to feed himself and his family on the herbs he could find, the
individual had to start eating meat and to unite with his neighbours in order to hunt game
in groups.40
38

Rousseau, “Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts,” in Major Political Writings, 11.

39

Cranston, Philosophers and Pamphleteers, 72.

40

Cranston, Philosophers and Pamphleteers, 72.

17

What begins as the hunt to meet needs, however, can easily become the means to create
greed. Rousseau claims that the communal acquisition of essential goods establishes a basis on
which we tend to expand our desires and subject ourselves to a state of perpetual shortage.
Prideful self-interests emerge as small groups expand to enjoy leisure time and develop
dependencies on luxuries. The visible production and distribution of affluence creates positional
goods (the value of which emanates from one’s exclusive possession of them and thus feeds our
amour-propre) in addition to use-value goods (which serve our amour de soi) . Accordingly, as
technological progress allows for the production and display of more positional goods, we are
increasingly drawn to products that confer status rather than meet needs. Rousseau worries that
these new inclinations of inflamed amour-propre increase the expense of our well-being. He
writes:
Aside from the fact that they continued to soften both body and mind, since these
conveniences lost almost all of their charm through habit, and since they had at the same
time degenerated into true needs, being deprived of them became much more cruel than
their possession was sweet, and they were unhappy to lose them without being happy to
possess them.41
Nevertheless, in Rousseau’s theory, careless attraction to such luxuries moves many
families and small societies to combine to increase their productive capacity. Once wanderers,
humans now adopt a more sedentary lifestyle. The growth of material extravagance and the
expansion of society produce the unhappy consequence that humans begin to instrumentalize
each other. In intimate social settings, members of a collective value each other as they adopt one
another’s interests. But in larger groups, one values the approval of others not because of the
shared interests that empathic understanding establishes but rather because their approval
41
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validates one’s sense of self-worth. Accordingly, we instrumentalize others for the sake of our
pride.
As the visibility of others and their valuables increases, Rousseau writes, “everyone
began to look at everyone else and to wish to be looked at himself, and public esteem acquired a
price.”42 As Neuhouser interprets this price, status-driven satisfaction will, on Rousseau’s
account, “be fleeting and insecure,” and any newfound “desires become boundless in a way that
is inimical to genuine happiness.”43 Amour-propre c auses humans to become dependent on more
and more goods for their psychological appeasement—goods that they can only appreciate in
proportion to what others appear to possess. Consequently, a continual climb to the peak of
social pride ensues. As we struggle harder to ascend according to the aim of our amour-propre,
new clouds invariably come to shroud the summit of our satisfaction.
Rather than promote well-being, prideful progress only makes the standards for
enjoyment more onerous. Such advancement may at first generate temporary ease, but additional
requisites for well-being soon follow. Worse still, our perpetual desire for supplementary status
goods establishes dependence on the gratuitous generation of new treasures above all else,
including equitable distribution. Thus, the corruption of our drive for recognition presents the
possibility “that a handful of people be glutted with superfluities while the starving multitude
lacks necessities.”44
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The development of amour-propre prompts Rousseau to distinguish between natural
inequality, which is unavoidable and “consists of the differences in age, health, strengths of
Body, and qualities of Mind, or of Soul,” and political inequality, which includes the privileges
to “be more wealthy, more honored, more powerful” than others.45 Natural inequalities are facts
that we must take into account in trying to promote the general will. Political inequalities, in
contrast, facilitate unnecessary competition that makes our well-being dependent on the
possessions and thoughts of others. Our pride creates a collective action problem: one that
ensnares us in a cycle of purposeless progress, propagates unnecessary political inequalities, and
makes us the cause of most of our misfortunes. As Rousseau observes:
The extreme inequality in our way of life — excess of idleness among some, excess of
labor among others; the ease with which our appetites and our sensuality are aroused and
satisfied; the overly refined foods of the rich, which feed them with rich sauces and
overwhelm them with indigestion; the bad food of the poor, which they are even short of
most of the time and the lack of which leads them to greedily stuff their stomachs when
they get the chance; late nights, excesses of every kind, immoderate outpourings of all the
passions, bouts of fatigue, and exhaustion of the mind; innumerable sorrows and pains
which are experienced in every social station and which perpetually gnaw away at men’s
souls: these are the fatal proofs that most of our ills are our own work.46
The project of self-government requires us to realize that these products of our inflamed
drive for recognition work against our well-being. Some harmful superfluities arise from our
propensity to chase positional goods; other missteps follow from the view that we are, or ought
to exercise our political power to be, the creators and manipulators of our external environment.
Recognizing how our amour-propre e scalates to self-idolatry does not come naturally,
especially in a technologically advanced society. Accordingly, Rousseau dedicates what one
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might call his two most famous constructive works to the question of how democracy can correct
for the principal product of aggravated amour-propre: political inequality. Through the
educational model in Emile and the ideal institutions of On the Social Contract, Rousseau seeks
to provide sources that can help us channel disillusionment with our constructed sense of status
toward cultivation of civil freedom and support of the general will.
In the following chapters, I examine how we may be led astray from the path to political
freedom that Rousseau charts toward what Neuhouser calls “unalienated selfhood.”47 Such a
conception of self does not substitute superficial forms of recognition from others for intimate
connections with them. Unalienated selfhood flourishes when others hold us accountable to
interests and ideals that lie beyond our concern for our self-image.
The technology of modern society, however, may increasingly encourage us to construct
a sense of ourselves that amounts to a mere facade that veils our self-estrangement. For
developments since Rousseau’s day have reinforced the relevance of his declaration that “the
education of society… is fit only for making double men, always appearing to relate everything
to others and never relating anything except to themselves alone.”48
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Chapter Two
The Actualization of Double Man

We are living during a technological revolution that is greatly changing how we interact
with one another. In the mid-to-late twentieth century, the global economy began to not only
revolve around material production but also increasingly expand through information
technology. Transistors that amplified electric signals, computers on which individuals could
store vast amounts of data, and the interconnected networks of the Internet marked a transition to
what we may call the Digital Age. Today, the floodgates to informational abundance have burst
open. Physical barriers to communication have eroded. Now, what happens beyond our daily
lives and the commentary we absorb about it transmits to us directly, as currents of transitory
personal displays and political narration continually guide our perception of peer activity and
public affairs.
At first glance, the recent increase in communicative reach, expansion of available
information, and dissemination of publishing power seem to constitute a profoundly positive
development for self-government. And indeed, there are many ways in which the Digital Age has
enhanced the efficiency of democratic participation and mobilization.
Far from realizing its emancipatory potential, however, our involvement in the digital
realm also presents threats to the project of political freedom. Although digital mediums sow
seeds for the effective democratization of political discussion, they may also produce a political
climate that pollutes civic space with an air of social superficiality. Contaminated by an overflow
of digital streams that subconsciously trigger dissatisfaction and division, our engagement in the
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public arena may decreasingly reflect our rational and reflective agency. The foundational
political issue of our time will be how our capacity for self-government evolves in this
environment, for all other policy questions are rooted in the kind of interests our political system
represents.
One might compare the Digital Age to the information revolution of the printing press,
which began to democratize the written word in the fifteenth century and played a key role in
laying the foundations of the Enlightenment ideology that Rousseau critiques. The advancements
of our day—the eradication of geographic limitations to communication, the creation of digital
goods that transcend the constraints of scarcity, and the diffusion of publishing power—are at
least no less culturally significant. And we may only be experiencing the beginning of a new era
that ushers in advancements in virtual reality and artificial intelligence that radically change the
way we live our lives.
The production and transportation that characterize the Information Age are primarily
informational, not physical, as Steve Jobs expresses when he describes computers as “bicycles
for the mind.”49 But like the political theorists of the past, we should question what road these
new technologies will ride on.
Rousseau claims that while social progress tends to exacerbate amour-propre—
 to tempt
us to steer our newfound vehicles of communication toward the aggrandizement of prideful
appearances—there is also no path to our primordial state of nature. For “savage man and
civilized man differ so much in their inmost heart and inclinations that what constitutes the
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supreme happiness of the one would reduce the other to despair.”50 We cannot vanquish the new
needs that the technological advancements of society instill in us. As Neuhouser notes, “our
conceptions of our basic needs, or of what is necessary to live a decent life, evolve in response to
social and cultural developments.”51 Relevantly, internet access is now deemed by many to be a
human right.
As we cannot reverse the new needs that amour-propre creates through mere political
direction, we may only do so through reasoned reflection. Rousseau’s approach to the problem of
aggravated amour-propre i s to trace its origins and function in society so that we may learn to
repurpose it to better promote our self-government. To reenact such civic education, however,
we must first examine its foil: the bourgeois education of society.

The Bourgeois R
 ole-Player
Rousseau was the first influential thinker to popularize the term “bourgeois. ” He uses it
to designate both the individual and the general character who is driven by superficial
pursuits—who isolates the drive for surface-level recognition from its intimate and reciprocal
underpinnings. By chasing pride without exercising civil freedom, the bourgeois seeks the
approval of his audience without aiming to understand them. Thus, his amour-propre fails to
play its part in establishing a sense of self-government that includes concern for others.
The bourgeois double man who, in holding a mirror to nature, sees only himself abuses
the instrument of social insight. He exploits nature for the sake of his status rather than using
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society as a means to support the general will. Instead of trying to secure self-reliance and simple
pleasures through the collaboration and social duties of civilization, he tries to civilize nature
through technology in order to recreate his surroundings in his own image. His good is
dependent on his fellow society members, as he would not have technology or status without
them. Yet his good does not include the interests of his peers, as his aim is technological
transcendence—the ill-fated attempt to recreate Rousseau’s asocial state of nature in society, for
the bourgeois l ongs to be the creator of his own world and to construct an artificial sanctuary
fitted specifically to his unique preferences.
In Rousseau’s theory, the desires of one who exploits rather than empathizes with others
in society are insatiable because one has no attachment to “a whole of which one is a part.”52 The
double man identifies himself in everything. He is, as Bloom claims, “a role-player,” who sees in
his interactions with others only depictions of himself.53 Consequently, the double man is
burdened by a gnawing sense of existential emptiness as he continually falls into what
philosopher Albert Camus calls the absurd: a “divorce between man and his life, the actor and
his setting.”54 The bourgeois c annot, as Camus suggests, embrace the absurd. For the
apprehension of the absurd is itself uncharacteristic of double men, who, “never relating
anything except to themselves alone,” wish to embody an environment that fully responds to
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their status-driven sense of self.55 Rousseau elaborates on the contradictions of our bourgeois
character:
Swept along in contrary routes by nature and by men, forced to divide ourselves between
these different impulses [of, as Rousseau writes, “always appearing to relate everything
to others and never relating anything except to” ourselves “alone”] we follow a
composite impulse which leads us to neither one goal nor the other. Thus, in conflict and
floating during the whole course of our life, we end it without having been able to put
ourselves in harmony with ourselves and without having been good either for ourselves
or for others.56
When we proceed down the path of bourgeois d esire to construct a world in our image,
we abuse our adaptability. The virtue of perfectibility, Rousseau suggests, is its promotion of
self-improvement (as, for example, in the state of nature we appropriate the instincts of other
animals to survive). Yet recreating our environments according to our drive for recognition
suggests transcending the constraints of self-government and feeding our insatiable desire for
attention. Directed toward this illusory end, double men not only distract themselves from
cultivating their gardens but also detach themselves from the ground of self-government itself.
Thus, they are left “in conflict and floating during the whole course” of their lives, unable to
intimately connect with anything beyond themselves that might offer them the hope of
resolution.57 In the Digital Age, double men may similarly misappropriate their bicycles for the
mind into cycles of purposeless progress.
Today, the conduit of bourgeois c haracter is not Enlightenment ideology but digital
ideology: faith in the increasing capacity of digital technology to empower us by showcasing our
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status and liberating us from our physical environment. In “The Californian Ideology,” media
theorists Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron write of the pervasiveness of a new kind of
dogma of digital progress: “a profound faith in the emancipatory potential of the new
information technologies” that features “a contradictory mix of technological determinism and
libertarian individualism.”58 As journalist Jacob Silverman observes, proponents of the
Californian Ideology view “digital capitalism as the harbinger of an era of widespread
prosperity” even as income inequality skyrockets.59 Their optimism originates not only in
historically deterministic views such as the inevitability of the equalization of conditions but also
from the promise of economic shift. They envision a future in which the production economy
already allows us to meet material needs and the new information-based consumption economy
opens a frontier in which all possess equal freedom for self-expression. However, more balanced
sociological consideration scrutinizes the character shifts that such innovation introduces. For
technology creates mere means, which we can direct toward ends that either promote our
freedom or support our servitude.
One effect of digital technology has been the actualization of the bourgeois d ouble man,
who is now split between the total embodiment of the physical realm and the absolute
interconnectedness of the digital realm. The modern double man inherits the same tension that
Bloom locates in Rousseau’s bourgeois character, who, as Bloom writes, “is contrasted by
Rousseau, on the one side, with the natural man, who is whole and simply concerned with
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himself, and on the other, with the citizen, whose very being consists in his relation to his city,
who understands his good to be identical with the common good.”60 Bloom further explains:
The bourgeois distinguishes his own good from the common good. His good requires
society and hence he exploits others while depending on them. He must define himself in
relation to them. The bourgeois comes into being when men no longer believe that there
is a common good, when the notion of the fatherland decays.61
The bourgeois disintegration of the common good clarifies in the contemporary
instantiation of the double man. For the digital realm in which the inflammation of amour-propre
occurs is different for everyone. As authors of the digital realm, we can personalize it through
recognition of our online behavior. Yet the malleability of our online appearances may create a
greater contrast with the immovable realities of the physical world.
Relationships increasingly begin and persist in a digital world that we appear in yet do
not inhabit. Initially alienated from more intimate connections, we increasingly rely only on
social visibility to forge our bonds. Accordingly, we lose the element of social accountability that
accompanies the rich rapport developed during face-to-face interactions. Others may become
instruments of our prideful self-awareness rather than ends in themselves whose well-being is
intertwined with our own. We need not adopt the interests of others to garner their approval; in
fact, the approval of others takes on a digital life of its own. We reduce others to mere “numbers
of matches” that we obtain on dating apps or “likes” that validate our posts. In such cases,
amour-propre f unctions as the driving force behind our attempted relationships—the form of
self-expression that clouds our genuine efforts with social superficiality. Mutual engagement of
online appearances exists independently of our lived experience and creates a layer of disconnect
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between our physical and digital selves. This disconnect, which originates within the bourgeois
character of the internally divided modern individual, emerges as a potential obstacle to our
ability to meaningfully connect with others in the Digital Age. The facade of greater society
remains in the endless expanse of the Internet, which, having hollowed out many thick
relationships, provides conditions in which bourgeois character can thrive.

Others as Instruments and the Danger of Individualism
The cultivation of the general will in democracy requires that individuals adopt one
another’s interests to allow for civil freedom. But, in the Digital Age, we increasingly encounter
the temptation to reduce others to instruments, as our peers seem to live in the audience of our
performances. From the bourgeois p erspective, others decreasingly appear as fellow members of
society with inner lives; rather, they increasingly function as mere followers whose worth
depends on the social approval they signal.
The basis for these claims lies not only in political theory but also in psychology. The
research surrounding Dunbar’s number suggests that as the size of societies expand and
technology extends our view of others, we sacrifice depth for breadth in our relationships. In the
1990s, British anthropologist Robin Dunbar found a correlation between primate brain size and
the size of social groups. He extrapolated that humans could calibrate their social behavior to
function in societies of only around 150 individuals. More recently, psychologists and
neuroscientists have supported Dunbar’s assertion and found that “this rule of 150 remains true
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for early hunter-gatherer societies as well as a surprising array of modern groupings…. Exceed
150, and a network is unlikely to last long or cohere well.”62
It makes sense, then, that as modern technology expands our connective capacity far
beyond Dunbar’s number, we may increasingly take social shortcuts to performatively signal our
allegiance rather than genuinely empathize with others. In cozy abodes, family members or close
friends value each other because they want to promote one another’s well-being; the interests of
those in one’s social circle become one’s own interests and provide a source of self-government.
But in larger social groupings, one comes to value the approval of others not because one has any
sort of relationship with or concern for them but rather because their approval validates one’s
sense of self-worth. Others become means to the end of our prideful self-awareness. As
Rousseau writes, when individuals interact in larger social groups, they progressively “grow
accustomed to consider different objects and to make comparisons… they imperceptibly acquire
ideas of merit and beauty that produce sentiments of preference.”63 It is not just Rousseau,
however, who notices the increasing instrumentalization of others as technology expands the size
of societies.
While Rousseau introduces the bourgeois d ouble man before the American and French
revolutions, Tocqueville responds to the emergence of political democracy and extends the
critique of bourgeois character to democratic ideology. For, as political theorist Michael Locke
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McLendon writes, Tocqueville “believes the passion [of amour-propre] to be essentially
democratic rather than aristocratic.”64
The supremacy that Tocqueville ascribes to democracy lies in its inevitable development
alongside the spread of information and material progress. He goes so far as to declare that “the
gradual development of equality of conditions is… a providential fact.”65 “When one runs
through the pages of our history,” Tocqueville claims, “one finds so to speak no great events in
seven hundred years that have not turned to the profit of equality.”66 Tocqueville continues to
support his assertion:
The Crusades and the wars with the English decimate the nobles and divide their lands;
the institution of townships introduces democratic freedom into the heart of the feudal
monarchy; the discovery of firearms equalizes the villein and the noble on the battlefield;
printing offers equal resources to their intelligence; the mail comes to deposit
enlightenment on the doorstep of the poor man’s hut as the portal of the palace;
Protestantism asserts that all men are equally in a state to find the path to Heaven.67
Tocqueville lives in a time in which the inventions of the Industrial Revolution such as
the telegraph and the railroad promise to provide networks that further disseminate the
expanding spirit of equality—a time in which the revolutions of the United States and France
have attempted to instill this spirit of equality in the political realm through the invention of
modern democracy. Tocqueville argues that such democratic endeavors are commendable but
warrant careful investigation to ensure that they promote self-interest well understood.
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For Tocqueville, the expansion of political freedom alongside the equality of conditions
is not inevitable. He does not mean to suggest, as Martin Luther King Jr. later does, that “the arc
of the moral universe… bends toward justice.”68 Rather than analyze abstract historical trends,
Tocqueville situates his study in nineteenth-century America, where democratic government and
mores have developed concurrently. While he sees that the spread of information and material
progress brings the benefit of a greater “equality of conditions” that lead to success, Tocqueville
also worries that these democratic developments may come at the expense of the democratic
individual’s ability to govern himself.69
Tocqueville observes that democratic ideology can promote a pervasive sense of
individualism that threatens to wither one’s exercise of civil freedom. He describes individualism
as characteristic “of democratic origin”—“a reflective and peaceable sentiment that disposes
each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of those like him.”70 Individualism contrasts with
the tendencies of aristocrats in previous centuries to be “almost always bound in a tight manner
to something that is placed outside of them” such that “they are often disposed to forget
themselves.”71 Tocqueville worries that the loss of this sense of self-transcendence will hamper
our ability to exercise our political freedom through self-government.
But his critique can also be integrated within Rousseau’s presentation of bourgeois
character. For the interactions of the bourgeois with others serve as mere reflections of the
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double man’s view of himself as an idol—validations of his individualism. Associations, on
Tocqueville’s account, expand our self-interest beyond individualism in much the same way that
civil freedom, in Rousseau’s theory, allows us to adopt the interests of a whole that transcends
our fixation on our personal amour-propre. The traits of aggravated amour-propre and
individualism, although Rousseau and Tocqueville attribute them to Enlightenment ideology and
democratic ideology respectively, both function as foils to the political freedom of
self-government.
Our inflamed drive for recognition and withdrawal into individualism may encourage
bourgeois characters to act as “double men, always appearing to relate everything to others and
never relating anything except to themselves alone.”72 Combining the character critiques of
Rousseau and Tocqueville will be especially useful in understanding the actualization of double
man in digital society. Tocqueville, like Rousseau, notes the increasing sacrifice of depth for
breadth in our relationships. Yet he interprets this shift as the symptom of democratic
individualism. He writes that as our exposure to others increases “in democratic centuries… the
bond of human affections is extended and loosened.”73
As technological progress and social visibility have increased, others have noticed the
tension between our individualism and drive for recognition that has allowed for greater social
superficiality. Sociologist David Riesman, in his 1950 book The Lonely Crowd, observes an
extension of the trend toward bourgeois character and the excessive drive for recognition that
Rousseau writes of. Riesman hypothesizes that our social mode of conformity changes in
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different stages of population growth. The ongoing transition, especially salient in Western urban
centers, is from “inner-directed” to “other-directed” society. Inner-directed character arises when
“the society of transitional population growth develops in its typical members a social character
whose conformity is insured by their tendency to acquire early in life an internalized set of
goals.”74 Other-directed character, in contrast, develops when “the society of incipient population
decline develops in its typical members a social character whose conformity is insured by their
tendency to be sensitized to the expectations and preferences of others.”75 While the “increased
personal mobility” of inner-directed character fits eras of expanding “production of goods and
people,” Riesman observes that now “fewer and fewer people work on the land or in the
extractive industries or even manufacturing.”76 Instead, modern technology has produced
“material abundance,” which other-directed people manage “by finding themselves in a
centralized and bureaucratized society and a world shrunken and agitated by the contact of races,
nations, and cultures.”77 In this setting, “other people a re the problem, not the material
environment.”78
Riesman further explains how other-directed character tempts us to transcend the bonds
of thick relationships at the expense of our ability to intimately connect with others:
The other-directed person learns to respond to signals from a far wider circle than is
constituted by his parents. The family is no longer a closely knit unit to which he belongs
but merely part of a wider social environment to which he early becomes attentive… the
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other-directed person is, in a sense, at home everywhere and nowhere, capable of a rapid
if sometimes superficial intimacy with and response to everyone.79
The internalized goals of the inner-directed character are thus largely replaced by the
single goal that characterizes other-directed society: attaining the attention of others. Yet, for
Rousseau, the drive for recognition does not itself provide a source for self-government. Our
common sense also supports this conclusion, as we say “he will do anything for attention.” But
Rousseau’s model student, Emile, will not. Recall Rousseau’s wish that Emile “will not precisely
say to himself, ‘I rejoice because they approve of me,’ but rather, ‘I rejoice because they approve
of what I have done that is good.’”80
In the Digital Age, the superficial chase for approval allows individuals to achieve a
sense of prideful self-awareness in the digital realm not through merit but merely by captivating
attention through “likes” that one can generate largely independent of what occurs in the physical
realm. The possibility of such misplaced approval not only increases sensationalism and
misinformation in news but also risks compromising our civil freedom.
To exercise Emile’s selective amour-propre—to appreciate recognition, but only insofar
as one earns it by taking the interests of others into account—requires an inner-directed
education. Yet the self-reliance that such an upbringing demands is increasingly hard to
maintain, as, in the Digital Age, we are constantly invited to perform for others.
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In the Theater of Self: Escapism or Insight?
In his 1978 book The Culture of Narcissism, sociologist Christopher Lasch writes that our
greater social visibility “encourages a theatrical approach to existence, a kind of absurdist theater
of self.”81 We enter the digital theater for the same reason we go to movies or shows: to escape
reality. Rousseau recognizes the appeal of such escapism but warns of the dangers that result
when we rely on appeasing our amour-propre a s a distraction from our need for the intimate
connections that promote our well-being and civil freedom. He observes that “when home is only
a sad solitude, one must surely go elsewhere for gaiety.”82 Yet often we compensate for our lack
of intimate connections by attempting to feed amour-propre, which tends to provide only cursory
satisfaction and ultimately works against our self-interest.
Silverman argues that digital tools not only fill the void of fulfillment that a lack of close
relationships leaves but also exacerbate our need for attention. He writes:
Social surveillance allows us to feel as if we have an audience at any time, waiting to be
summoned. The individuals we imagine as seeing our updates may not actually be there;
they may not be online at all, but the amorphousness of our public is part of its appeal.
It’s potentially infinite, if only we can satisfy them, causing them to spread our words
through the network.
Social surveillance fulfills our hunger to see and be seen. It offers a finishing
school for the self, in which our public performances complete and complement
our private identity construction.83
Unfortunately, the school of digital society that Silverman describes is at odds with the
advice on political education that both Rousseau and Tocqueville offer. In Emile, Rousseau
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prescribes engagement with the natural world to limit the superfluous desires that stem from
excessive amour-propre. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville praises associations as schools
of democracy wherein people with common interests come together. Associations, alongside
practices such as jury duty and town meetings, allow citizens to practice political engagement.
Contrastingly, digital society may cultivate a sense of self whose bourgeois character merely
masks a deeper sense of Tocquevillian individualism.
Accordingly, Silverman worries that digital identity construction can function as a
misguided form of escapism. When “we invite people to be voyeurs and… to take some
vicarious pleasure in our lives,” he writes, “the documentary impulse is its own reward, so we
submit, or demand, to be documented.”84 Amour-propre becomes the overpowering end to which
we act. Yet Silverman considers that “maybe there’s something we’re missing in the
moment—beyond the fact that filming, staring into that small screen rather than at the thing
itself, can make us feel like we’re not in t he moment.”85
Perhaps this “something” resides in the very inescapability of our escapism. In a world in
which our perception is increasingly mediated by a detached digital lens, we begin to lose a
sense of realism, intimate attachment to others, and the value of truth. Actual achievements,
events, and relationships become mere means that serve the end of escaping ourselves through a
digitally achieved sense of prideful self-awareness that need not correspond to reality. As
Riesman notes, when our relationships with others cast them as members of the audience of our
performances, “people and friendships are viewed as the greatest of all consumables.”86 Through
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this shift, we may sacrifice the sense of self-security that civil freedom affords, as “the
tremendous competitive energies which the inner-directed person had available for the sphere of
production… seem now to flow into competition for the much more amorphous security of the
peer-group’s approval.”87
The outcomes of this movement can be both dehumanizing and disheartening.
Tocqueville notes the reduction of individuality to the impersonal power of opinion, as
“individuals appear smaller and society seems greater, or rather, each citizen, having become like
all the others, is lost in the crowd, and one no longer perceives [anything] but the vast and
magnificent image of the people itself.”88 For Tocqueville, the democratic dogma of the power of
public opinion compromises our individuality and dehumanizes us into a mere mass of
observers.
For Rousseau, our escapism into the approval of others gives us reason to be
disheartened, as it hampers the hope that civil freedom can encourage self-government. He
examines our psychological vulnerability to the coercive effects of general opinion and suggests
that bourgeois c haracter makes us uniquely susceptible to the whims of the amorphous audience
that comprises our conception of “popular.” When our amour-propre e ncourages us to view
others as mere audience members continually ready to render judgment on our performances, we
search in vain for meaningful connection because we instrumentalize others for the sake of our
vanity.
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Amour-propre should not be the sole end that we seek in our social life. Rousseau worries
that if it is, democracy will suffer, as our civil freedom fractures into individual cases of double
men, perpetually “in conflict and floating” away from their potential for self-government.89
Riesman, however, writes that liberating insight is not impossible for the other-directed
character:
If the other-directed people should discover how much needless work they do, discover
that their own thoughts and their own lives are quite as interesting as other people’s, that,
indeed, they no more assuage their loneliness in a crowd of peers than one can assuage
one’s thirst by drinking sea water, then we might expect them to become more attentive
to their own feelings and aspirations.90
To escape the insatiable pursuits of other-directed character, we must recognize that
when our communication with others relies on their approval of our performances rather than
our adoption of their interests, we slip into a kind of superficiality that damages the foundations
of not only self-government but also well-being. Aggravated amour-propre causes our
relationships—those connections that Rousseau suggests provide the principal source of both
our formation and our fulfillment—to ring hollow, for, as Lasch notes, “personal relations
founded on reflected glory, on the need to admire and be admired, prove fleeting and
insubstantial.”91
The question that concerns us today, then, is how to counter the adverse effects—most
notably the instrumentalization of others—of corrupted amour-propre. For this vice hampers
the very civil freedom on which self-government depends. The technology of the Digital Age
tempts us to use our screens as chambers of reflection that feed our drive for recognition.
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As we will see, we are continually encouraged by design t o perform for others,
sometimes without our even realizing it. For while humans are not the creators of the natural
world, they are the makers of the digital realm. Consequently, the inflammation of
amour-propre may increase according not only to the forces of historical progress but also to
the pressures manufactured by the technology companies that manage the mediums of our
communication.
If the modern actualization of double man presents greater obstacles to political
freedom, it also grants Rousseau’s account of education in Emile r enewed relevance. For
Rousseau offers a model to promote the very unalienated selfhood that excessive amour-propre
divides. As Neuhouser notes, Rousseau presents instruction in two sequential yet interrelated
areas: natural education and civic education.
The first order of Emile’s education is to allow him, unencumbered by his
amour-propre, the freedom to engage with the natural world and follow his intellectual pursuits.
His subjection to the laws of nature and his inner-directed interests rather than to his drive for
recognition will help him prioritize needs that support the general will above desires that fuel an
insatiable sense of pride. Emile’s natural education inculcates in him a sense of self-reliance,
for, as Neuhouser writes, “once Emile has taken up his place in society, he will need certain
internal resources—the strengths of a self-reliant character—in order to confront the moral
dangers posed by his dependence on others in love, in work, and in citizenship.”92
Because Emile cannot return to the state of nature and is not destined to live his life
isolated from society, he must also have a civic education. As his social life will inevitably
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increase his amour-propre, this self-love ought to be directed toward civil freedom rather than
status-based domination. It is in this vein that Emile is to learn from his connection with his
lover, Sophie, how to shift from his natural to his civic education. The purpose of Emile’s
temporary departure from Sophie is for him to learn to exercise self-government as an
expansion of rather than a sacrifice of his self-interest, as Emile’s interests align with something
greater than himself—the interests of his future family.
Neuhouser emphasizes the importance of cultivating amour-propre within civic
education. He writes that the drive for recognition need not be negative and is, in fact, an
essential component of political freedom for most people:
Amour-propre is psychologically indispensable because the ‘higher’ (more sublimated)
desire to be merely worthy o f honor is generally too weak, and too difficult to acquire and
maintain, to be relied on alone to sustain moral agency over time in the face of powerful,
competing motivations.93
Due to this difficulty, as Neuhouser explains, for the most part, “humans acquire the
capacity to ‘honor themselves’ for their rational conduct only by internalizing the evaluative
perspective of an originally external authority whose approval or esteem they long to secure.”94
Yet increasingly, in the Digital Age, this external authority is dehumanized and hollowed
out into the amorphous audience that Tocqueville calls the “phantom of a public opinion.”95 Its
influence seeps into our private lives as our transcendent connective capacity escalates our social
visibility and drive for recognition beyond our ability to apprehend the interests of those with
whom we engage. Consequently, the intrusion of aggravated amour-propre i nto our private lives
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may obstruct our natural education. And the divisiveness of the individualism that the
technological personalization of the digital realm encourages may disrupt our civic education. In
short, the contemporary increase of democratic envy and decrease of empathic association
around common interests may corrupt our amour-propre a nd constrain our capacity to
self-govern.
In the next two chapters, I examine the digital extensions of our drive for recognition and
our recession into individualism, so that we may better understand how the educational advice of
Rousseau and Tocqueville applies to our current situation.
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Chapter Three
Recognition through Social Surveillance

The corrupted amour-propre o f the double man may permeate the culture of the Digital
Age more completely than it did the societies of the Enlightenment. For today, the digital domain
offers us an effectively unlimited supply of thin relationships that we may exploit for the sake of
inflamed amour-propre t hrough personal and political performance. Our digital selves are
constantly visible to peers—and, more completely, to large technology companies—on platforms
such Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. If we accept political theorist Pierre Manent’s
characterization of Rousseau’s assessment that “comparing oneself to others is the misfortune
and original sin of men in our societies,” then we must conclude that we face a reality in which
such trespassing is increasingly integrated into everyday life.96
In the Digital Age, we often willingly subject ourselves to social surveillance for the
sense of validation. We progressively construct our own enclosures in a kind of digital zoo in
which we live to be seen. Whether one participates in social media or not, one risks losing a
degree of agency in this environment. For the many distractions of the digital realm involve the
particular allure of worlds that mirror our sense of self rather than reflect the natural world of
which we are merely a part.
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The Drive for Data and New Needs
Many of today’s most profitable companies depend on mass consumption of
technological goods such as television, the Internet, and social media. Increasingly, the
relationship of consumer to product is not that of owner to object but rather that of user to
service. We expect to be able to use services such as Google and Facebook for free, but in return
we renounce ownership of our personal data, which Big Tech companies accrue to nudge user
behavior toward profitable market bases for advertisers.97  The result for users is an increasingly
personalized consumptive experience. While often convenient and captivating, the outcomes of
this business model for consumers may also turn our portals to the outside world into reflections
of our bias and insecurity.
While we watch our screens, Big Tech companies watch us so that they can profit off of
our particular self-conceptions and status-based pursuits. Our drive for recognition is constantly
recognized and encouraged yet never fully fulfilled. For Big Tech profits when their algorithms
aim to inflame our amour-propre i n order to manufacture new needs. As philosopher Edward
Skidelsky and economist Robert Skidelsky write, “advertising is the ‘organized creation of
dissatisfaction.’” 98
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The economic success of companies such as Google and Facebook is largely predicated
on their ability to extract from us a valuable form of economic property—our data—and feed us
back information, including political news, that is polarized according to our personal desires.
Consequently, the economic status of Big Tech companies tends to rise in inverse proportion to
the economic power most people derive from their data. Historian Yuval Noah Harari predicts
that “in the 21st century, data will eclipse both land and machinery as the most important asset,
so politics will be a struggle to control data’s flow.”99 But two decades into the twenty-first
century, the transfer of data from ordinary people to a few dominant companies has occurred
more through surrender than struggle.
Lack of data privacy exacerbates economic inequality in ways that remain poorly
understood due to informational asymmetry between users and Big Tech companies. But for the
purposes of this paper, the more pertinent problem lies in what users receive in return for their
data. While personalized consumptive experience provides convenience for those shopping on
Amazon or listening to music on Spotify, it has dangerous implications for our political
discourse, especially given the superficial social environment of the Internet. Since the dominant
digital news model depends on our consumption of whatever information will captivate our
attention for as long as possible, our civic space increasingly encourages continual exaggeration
and polarization of the political views that most immediately attract or outrage us. In this
environment, online harassment, virtue signaling, and cancel culture often disrupt thoughtful
debate about issues such as data privacy and economic inequality.
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Tocqueville claims that “in the constitution of all peoples… there is a point at which the
legislator is obliged to rely on the good sense and virtue of citizens.”100 Democracies especially
depend on the capacity of the people to check centralized power and recognize social ills. But the
polarizing and superficial nature of news and political discussion in the Digital Age threatens to
distract us from the very technological shifts that exacerbate our amour-propre.
The divisive character of digital political news ricochets out to aggravate the general
political discourse outside of the digital realm. Even those who try to disconnect from the more
obvious theaters of self in the digital world such as social media face increasing incentives to
submit to a drive for recognition that seeks approval from others rather than understanding of
others. Big Tech business models profit from the advertising opportunities that the insatiable
desires of inflamed amour-propre c reate. Targeted digital news appeals to the particular sense of
status we ascribe to our political in-groups. And, above all, the acquisition of the most valuable
good in the digital world—data—depends on the sole goal of capturing the attention of users.
Aggravated amour-propre i s thus not only an aspect of bourgeois c haracter in the Digital Age
but also the central driving force of the digital economy.
The assumption of amour-propre as our ultimate drive is not inevitable. Rather, it is, as it
was when Rousseau wrote, a feature of our faith in technology that we ascribe the role of
transcendence to chambers of reflection that present us with environments that confirm our
supreme status—worlds made in our image. But like many forms of faith, such belief requires a
degree of blindness, for this dream of deliverance has its downsides.
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We often perform for others without even realizing it, as we want not only our
expressions but also our tastes to be recognized. Our self-interest increasingly resides in things
being just so rather than in “a whole of which one is a part.”101 One’s digital surroundings are
staged according to what validates one’s sense of status, so one may increasingly aim for the
same in the physical domain. This creates a zero-sum game, the end of which is the superfluous
sense of self-awareness that accompanies ascent to the top of the social rank. But such
satisfaction is illusory, for, in the words of Epicurus, “nothing is enough for the man to whom
enough is too little.”102
In Rousseau’s view, the technology of social progress makes the use-value goods that
amour de soi a ims at satisfiable. Governments, too, can respond to the common interests that
social bodies cultivate through their exercise of civil freedom. For bonds between families,
friends, and other members of small groups establish collective interests that encourage
self-government and thus keep the excessive desires of our personal pride in check. But, as
Neuhouser writes, when motivated by amour-propre,  “ desires become boundless in a way that is
inimical to genuine happiness.”103

Self-Consciousness as Suppression
The aggravation of amour-propre fosters a focus on appearances that alienates us from
the more fulfilling interests that civil freedom affords, substitutes the allure of visibility for the
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value of intimacy, and fashions the function of other members of society into viewers in an
amorphous audience. Digital social visibility may multiply the corruption of self-awareness that
Rousseau associates with the emergence of developed society, when “to be and to appear became
two entirely different things” and inspired “ostentatious display, deceitful cunning, and all the
vices that follow in their wake.”104 Rousseau claims that this divergence between being and
appearing reflects not a fixed form of social liberation but rather our evolving requirements for
social success, for as groups increase in size, we increasingly rely on social shortcuts to assess
others. Rousseau writes that as such other-directed society emerged, “for one’s advantage, it was
necessary to appear to be different from what one in fact was.”105
Accordingly, in the Digital Age, our obsession with appearances not only generates
insatiable desires but also establishes social constraints on authentic self-expression that grow
increasingly stringent as the distinction between being and appearing grows more complete. If
the excessive self-awareness of Rousseau’s developed society represents a first Edenic Fall, then
the digital development of a second mode of existence in which everything is performed and
presented symbolizes a second Fall into our own chambers of reflection. Lasch writes on the
repressive effects of such artificial acceleration of self-awareness:
Awareness commenting on awareness creates an escalating cycle of self-consciousness
that inhibits spontaneity. It intensifies the feeling of inauthenticity that rises in the first
place out of resentment against the meaningless roles prescribed by modern industry.
Self-created roles become as constraining as the social roles from which they are meant
to provide ironic detachment. We long for the suspension of self-consciousness, of the
pseudoanalytic attitude that has become second nature.106
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Entranced by their own self-image, individuals in the Digital Age perhaps become
estranged from the selves they inhabit. They may subconsciously wish to break free from their
chambers of reflection and, in Tocqueville’s words, be “bound in a tight manner to something
that is placed outside of them” such that “they are often disposed to forget themselves.”107 Yet
they cannot forget the very self-awareness that characterizes their Fall into the superficial society
of the bourgeois, for they are conditioned by democratic dogma to employ the amorphous
audience of public opinion as a mirror that reflects their self-worth.
Here we reach Tocqueville’s particular worry about democracy: that the expansion of
equality may generate misguided faith in approval from a dehumanized “phantom of a public
opinion” as the ultimate arbiter of self-worth.108 Unlike Rousseau, whose declaration of the
exclusive legitimacy of democracy was revolutionary, Tocqueville takes the growth of
democracy and political equality for granted. What concerns Tocqueville, then, is not
self-government as the ability to officially create the laws to which one is subject. Rather,
Tocqueville worries that democracy may undermine itself through the very empowerment it
inspires. He claims that democratic mores risk reducing our internal propensity to acquire the
interests that associations with others, conceptions of greatness, and belief in religion confer.
Consequently, democratic developments may tempt us away from our tendency to self-govern
our own behavior in accordance with our sense of self-interest well understood.
One may suggest a sort of tension between the theories of Rousseau and Tocqueville
here. Tocqueville critiques our adherence to public opinion and general ideas as a cheapening of
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our sense of pride, which could otherwise be directed toward self-interest well understood. Might
he be suggesting that Rousseau’s support of the general will—the set of fundamental desires that
belong to each of the members of a political community—likewise undermines self-government?
It is quite possible that Tocqueville took himself to be, in part, correcting Rousseau’s
account. Rousseau’s social contract theory influenced the French Revolution, which Tocqueville
praised for its goal of political freedom but lamented for the continual tumult into which its
mob-like majoritarianism threw the country before and during Tocqueville’s lifetime.
Additionally, Tocqueville tends to locate the source of self-government in ideas (around which
associations form, conceptions of greatness motivate, and religions guide behavior), while
Rousseau sees our ability to adopt the interests of others as the principal force governing our
selfish interests. Perhaps Tocqueville doubted that the mere combination of
self-interests—without the inspiration of bettering the soul through belief—could promote
self-interest well understood. In any case, Rousseau’s conception of the general will differs from
Tocqueville’s presentation of the power of public opinion.
The general will is deeply personal. To will it, one must exercise the civil freedom of
understanding others and adopting their fundamental interests as particular expressions of the
universal human condition. Man supports the general will when he socially codifies his innate
tendency to feel empathy and pity—when he sees his interests through the eyes of others and
proceeds to substitute “justice for instinct in his conduct… by giving his actions the morality
they previously lacked.”109 The general will, as Neuhouser explains, “is not, then, the aggregate

109

Rousseau, “On the Social Contract,” in Major Political Writings, 175.

50

‘happiness’ of some group with which the general will is concerned but rather the good—more
specifically, the fundamental interests—of each individual member.”110
In contrast, Tocqueville’s concepts of “general ideas” and the “public opinion” function
as forces disembodied from the members of society. They need not include consideration of a
particular individual's interests. Rather, they may overpower the free thought of the individual or
alter the interests that it is socially acceptable for one to express.
Public opinion can thus constrain the emancipatory potential for self-improvement that a
more complete form of political freedom might tap. Our theaters of self appear to express
themselves freely, but the dominant power of social surveillance pressures us to display
ourselves rather than to know and improve ourselves by means besides the popularity of
performance. In so far as people’s audience is composed of family, friends, or fellow members of
association, performative self-expression may prompt helpful feedback that directs actors toward
a motivating idea that is “bound in a tight manner to something that is placed outside of them.”111
But when the dominant formative force of our self-interest is only popularity and the
drive for recognition, we submit to a type of tyranny that Tocqueville calls the “despotism
democratic nations have to fear.”112 We slide into a passive sort of reliance on the “phantom of a
public opinion,” which, with the self-interest well understood of its members hollowed out,
restricts our freedom of expression.113 This danger is applicable in America, where democratic
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government and mores have developed concurrently. Accordingly, Tocqeville writes that he does
“not know any country where, in general, less independence of mind and genuine freedom of
discussion reign than in America,” for “in America the majority draws a formidable circle
around thought.”114 The pervasiveness of immaterial despotism is greater, and perhaps more
dangerous, than traditional forms of tyranny, Tocqueville warns:
Thought is an invisible and almost intangible power that makes sport of all tyrannies. In
our day the most absolute sovereigns of Europe cannot prevent certain thoughts hostile to
their authority from mutely circulating in their states and even in the heart of their courts.
It is not the same in America: as long as the majority is doubtful, one speaks; but when it
has irrevocably pronounced, everyone becomes silent and friends and enemies alike then
seem to hitch themselves together to its wagon.115
Similarly, in the Digital Age, the interest of journalists in encouraging thoughtful
reflection on topics of political importance and building consensus increasingly must submit to
the pressure of social surveillance. Today, however, such chilling of free speech tends to reflect
the will of agitated political factions rather than the interests of the majority. In “The Enemies of
Writing,” George Packer, a staff writer for The Atlantic, describes the control that ideological
groups exercise over the deeper purpose of writing to promote understanding—a development
that leads him to conclude that “the greatest enemy of writing today might be despair”:
Writers are now expected to identify with a community and to write as its representatives.
In a way, this is the opposite of writing to reach other people. When we open a book or
click on an article, the first thing we want to know is which group the writer belongs to.
The group might be a political faction, an ethnicity or a sexuality, a literary clique. The
answer makes reading a lot simpler. It tells us what to expect from the writer’s work, and
even what to think of it. Groups save us a lot of trouble by doing our thinking for us.
Politicians and activists are representatives. Writers are individuals whose job is to find
language that can cross the unfathomable gap separating us from one another. They don’t
write as anyone beyond themselves. But today, writers have every incentive to do their
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work as easily identifiable, fully paid-up members of a community. Belonging is
numerically codified by social media, with its likes, retweets, friends, and followers.
Writers learn to avoid expressing thoughts or associating with undesirables that might be
controversial with the group and hurt their numbers. In the most successful cases, the
cultivation of followers becomes an end in itself and takes the place of actual writing.116
When the end of writing becomes the maintenance of superficial appearances, writers fall
to double man’s function, according to Bloom, as “a role-player.”117 The writer as a bourgeois
role-player must weigh in on matters of the common good yet do so only to maintain the
legitimacy of his personal appearance in relation to other writers. Accordingly, the importance of
signaling to factions or captivating attention through click-bait headlines overwhelms the
writer’s role as a facilitator of informed and unbiased discussion about the common good. The
drive for recognition that characterizes inflamed amour-propre becomes the writer’s end not
because he chooses it but rather because public opinion imposes it.
Resistance against the subtle yet coercive control that prideful self-awareness exercises
over political discourse must overcome a barrage of self-imposed barriers that the “orthodoxy
enforced by social pressure” has conditioned us to consider.118 For, as Packer points out, writers
increasingly perform their role with “the fear of moral judgment, public shaming, social ridicule,
and ostracism.”119
This trend marks but one example of the continued applicability of Tocqueville’s
observation that in “democratic republics, tyranny … leaves the body and goes straight for the
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soul.”120 Especially in the Digital Age, passivity of thought due to the dominance of public
opinion can push us to a form of despotism in which people are bound by their drive for
recognition and enveloped in short-term attractions. Such an environment is not conducive to our
ascent to self-interest well understood. As Tocqueville describes democratic despotism:
It is absolute, detailed, regular, far-seeing, and mild. It would resemble paternal power if,
like that, it had for its object to prepare men for manhood; but on the contrary, it seeks
only to keep them fixed irrevocably in childhood; it likes citizens to enjoy themselves
provided that they think only of enjoying themselves. It willingly works for their
happiness; but it wants to be the unique agent and sole arbiter of that; it provides for their
security, foresees and secures their needs, facilitates their pleasures, conducts their
principal affairs… can it not take away from them entirely the trouble of thinking and the
pain of living?121
Although Tocqueville claims that democratic despotism goes straight to the soul, today
the coercive impact of public opinion and our drive for recognition also affects us through the
algorithms of digital mediums. For the business models of Big Tech companies such as Google
and Facebook incentivize the aggravation of amour-propre in our civic space. In The Age of
Surveillance Capitalism, Harvard Business School professor Shoshana Zuboff provides a
detailed analysis of the rise of “a new species of power” that she calls “instrumentarianism.”122
“Instrumentarian power knows and shapes human behavior toward others’ ends,” Zuboff writes,
as “digital connection is now a means to others’ commercial ends.”123
This trend presents the threat of a new kind of democratic despotism that compromises
the freedom of individuals in order to “instrumentalize and control human experience to
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systematically and predictably shape behavior toward others’ profitable ends.”124 The others in
this case are companies like Google and Facebook, who brand themselves as promoters of
democracy and sociability—hence, the term “social media”—yet whose financial incentive is to
collect personal data and guide user behavior toward market bases in which Big Tech can most
effectively target consumers with ads. This model, when applied to the consumption of news,
may promote an individualistic entrenchment of our biases.
Such entrenchment, in turn, makes us more susceptible to the power of opinion.
Distracted by our drive for recognition, we fail to notice how the contours of our discourse are
contained within the ideological echo-chambers that Big Tech companies nudge us toward.
Zuboff elaborates on the inconspicuous encroachment, designed to fly under our radar, of
surveillance capitalism on our political freedom:
It is the nature of instrumentarian power to operate remotely and move in stealth. It does
not grow through terror, murder, the suspension of democratic institutions, massacre, or
expulsion. Instead, it grows through declaration, self-authorization, rhetorical
misdirection, euphemism, and the quiet, audacious backstage moves specifically crafted
to elude awareness as it replaces individual freedom with others’ knowledge and replaces
society with certainty. It does not confront democracy but rather erodes it from within,
eating away at the human capabilities and self-understanding required to sustain a
democratic life.125
Recall that, as the data and profit of Big Tech companies depend on how much time we
spend on their platforms, they incentivize our amour-propre. Fittingly, our platforms prompt
“status updates.” The more that every online action of ours fulfills our drive for recognition, the
more easily companies can surveil our activity, recognize us, and target us with ads. While the
ads themselves are often minor distractions or can include helpful information, the means
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through which digital mediums manipulate users to most effectively deploy ads may promote
superficiality through social surveillance.
As the drive for data incentivizes the acquisition of our attention above all else, the
dominant form of messaging online is scaled down to easily digestible simple and superficial bits
that overload our senses and trigger our passions rather than promote reasoned reflection and
greater understanding of fellow members of society. Digital news is made, above all, to vie for
our time to keep us on the platform longer so that it can extract more data from us. Accordingly,
sucked in by our attraction to news that requires minimal capacity for understanding from us in
our role as consumers, we may become mindlessly entranced by our news feeds. In such cases,
the democratization of political news reaches a level of emotional superficiality that, in turn,
precludes the exercise of reflection on which both civil freedom and self-interest well understood
depend.
The triggers of digital technology direct our theaters of self to our emotional reactions
rather than our rational conclusions. This danger may develop due to the impact that the shift
from inner-directed to other-directed society introduces to our news intake. Consider how
Riesman describes how emerging forms of entertainment in the mid-twentieth century impact
our self-awareness:
The other-directed girl who goes in company to the movies need not talk to the others
during the picture but is sometimes faced with the problem: should she cry at the sad
places or not? What is the proper reaction… it is sometimes apparent that people feel
they ought to react, but how?
In contrast to this, the inner-directed person, reading a book alone, is less aware of the
others looking on; moreover, he has time to return at his own pace from being transported
by his reading…. His successor, dreading loneliness, tries to assuage it not only in his
crowd but in those fantasies that, like a mirror, only return his own concerns to him.126
126
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Today’s dominant news mediums place us in a political theater similar to the movie
theater that Riesman’s other-directed girl enters. However, we need not physically travel to this
news theater; the theater comes to us. In it, the emotional reactions we present in response to
political information help shape our news feeds. Signaling emotional reactions becomes more
important than inhabiting them, as the relationship between audience and performance becomes
interchangeable. Digital features such as Facebook’s emoji reactions on our news feeds allow us
to signal emotions that help dictate what we see on our screens. But our reactions also influence
the shows that reach others. Accordingly, we may alienate ourselves from the authenticity of our
emotions. The divide between being and appearing allows us to signal an expression of how we
feel we ought to react that often differs from our actual reaction, as when Facebook users react
with the laughter emoji to delegitimize messages that they disagree with.
The gap between being and appearing in civic space creates what Lasch calls “an
escalating cycle of self-consciousness—a sense of the self as a performer.”127 As our
performances need not cohere with physical reality, our self-consciousness promotes a lack of
accountability and weakens many of the social penalties for bad behavior. Meanwhile, social
pressure invades our news intake, as the inner-directed idea of reading a newspaper or book for
the purpose of political reflection recedes into the past. How we digest the news that digital
mediums and other people present becomes an exercise in how we present ourselves. In such
circumstances, the principles of Tocquevillian positive pride often yield to the divisive effects of
Rousseau’s prideful self-awareness shaped by social pressure. Accordingly, we may become like
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Riesman’s other-directed character, who, “dreading loneliness, tries to assuage it not only in his
crowd but in those fantasies that, like a mirror, only return his own concerns to him.”128
Lasch argues that societies that promote more social visibility relative to intimate
connection, more other-directedness relative to inner-directedness, and the sense of the self as a
perpetual performer create a culture of narcissism. Political commentator David Brooks traces
the continuation of this trend, as he notes a rise in narcissism as measured by psychologists. He
reports that “the median narcissism score has risen 30 percent in the last two decades,” and that
“ninety-three percent of young people score higher than the middle score just twenty years ago.”
129

According to Brooks, this rise is part of “a broad shift from a culture of humility to the culture

of what you might call the Big Me, from a culture that encouraged people to think humbly of
themselves to a culture that encouraged people to see themselves as the center of the universe.”130
Such direction of social progress toward the drive for recognition for its own sake is just what
Rousseau and Tocqueville feared might inhibit political freedom.

Democratic Envy and the Fear of Irrelevance
When our chambers of reflection cause our digital technology to function as mirrors that
reflect the importance of self-image rather than the possibility of civil freedom, our connection to
others becomes a mere mode of activating envy. As our interests are not expanded through
intimate engagement with others or reflection on religion and other conceptions of higher virtues,
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our potential for greatness and perfectibility is distilled to the intensification of amour-propre
and the display of wealth as a symbol of social status. Our increased social visibility then
incentivizes surface-level comparison rather than the intimate connections and spiritual sense
that might allow us to self-govern according to our self-interest well understood.
Attaining the political education that unlocks internal political freedom is no easy task,
for, as philosopher Alexander Jech writes, on Tocqueville’s account, “our self-interest naturally
subverts itself, and its true achievement requires considerable enlightenment and virtue.”131 Jech
continues:
This need for education presupposes something analogous to the doctrine of original
sin… men naturally seek repose in material well-being, but this natural desire undermines
the growth of our most human capacities, including the capacity for self-government that
is required for political liberty.132
If love of material well-being as an illusory sense of self-worth marks our original sin,
then the democratic envy that our increased connective capacity encourages marks a reenactment
of our original infringement, repeatedly leading us farther away from the path to
self-government.
Tocqueville already observes that the superficial pursuit of money is greater in
democracies because of the intermingling of different classes. The sense of greatness that in
aristocratic times derives from many different honorable pursuits reduces in democracies to
exclusive pride in monetary power. Accordingly, Tocqueville claims that “men who live in
democratic times have many passions; but most of their passions end in love of wealth or issue
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from it.”133 In aristocracies, concern about money among the upper class is considered crude. But
in democratic societies where money is the dominant expression of status and greatness,
bourgeois character thrives.
Since money is a positional good rather than a use-value good, the love of money that
comprises the bourgeois c haracter of Americans may support a class system based less on utility
derived from culture than on status derived from cash. The shared visibility of different classes
makes inequities increasingly apparent and encourages us to establish a positional sense of
self-worth. As Lasch observes, “in a society in which the dream of success has been drained of
any meaning beyond itself, men have nothing against which to measure their achievements
except the achievements of others.”134 Even one of the most famous figures of capitalism, Adam
Smith, regards the pursuit of money as an appeal for approval that inflames our sense of envy: “It
is vanity, not the ease or pleasure, which interests us, ” he writes, as “the rich man glories in his
riches, because he feels that they naturally draw upon him the attention of the work.”135
The Digital Age encourages the exercise of such vanity, which increases an insatiable
desire for superfluous goods in democracy. Fittingly, Tocqueville recognizes that democracies
are especially prone to wasteful luxuries, as they distill virtue to materialistic measures. He
writes that “there is hypocrisy of virtue in all times,” but “that of luxury belongs more
particularly to democratic centuries.”136
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The effects of the superficial presentation of our digital selves have largely further
inflamed our amour-propre and produced more feelings, as McLendon writes, of “vanity,
arrogance, and contempt” in the winners and “shame, envy, and spite” in the losers of
status-good acquisition and presentation.137 This development arises, in part, because, as political
theorist Sam Arnold explains, digital society has shifted “people’s ‘consumption reference
groups’”:
Prior to roughly 1970, people compared themselves mainly to those in their immediate
social environment—e.g., neighbors, friends, relatives, and coworkers. Economic
disparities within such groups being relatively limited, this way of constructing one’s
consumption reference group tended to establish feasible consumption norms; keeping up
with the Joneses isn’t impossible when the Joneses have roughly the same income as you.
Keeping up with the Kardashians, on the other hand, is a different matter entirely—and
yet this is precisely what most of us now try to do.138
Unrealistic desires based on the broad social comparisons that digital technology allows
have “upscaled” our consumptive norms and increased the costliness of our amour-propre.139 Yet
such habits have also shifted in response to an illusion that digital society is uniquely likely to
promote. The digital selves that we display through avatars on online platforms and the data
profiles that companies collect can function almost entirely independent of our physical selves.
Accordingly, the persona people portray online is often quite different from the character they
embody in the rest of their lives.
Transparency and social consequences diminish in our digital theater of selves. Our
expectations and desires further conflict with our private circumstances, as our chase for
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positional goods renders the circumstances in which we live perpetually inadequate. The
democratization of social visibility can thus lead to greater inequality. For the amour-propre of
mere appearances, detached from the intimate adoption of the interests of those with whom we
engage, may produce an insatiable attraction to status—an escalating yearning to raise one’s
social rank not for the material security it brings but for the sake of our self-image itself.
Perhaps part of the problem is that our increased social surveillance has spread our
relationships too thin to cultivate democratic virtues that may only flourish in intimate societies.
Rousseau worries that when bourgeois c haracter invades civic space, vanity replaces virtue and
democratic dysfunction ensues. He would likely look at contemporary political discourse and
conclude that democracy is in great danger. Consider that the requisite conditions he lists for a
functioning social contract—“a very small state… great simplicity of morals… great equality of
ranks and fortunes… [and] little to no luxury”—are all on the decline in the Digital Age.140
Together, they comprise the basis for democratic virtue, which Rousseau notes is the “principle
of a republic,” according to Montesquieu.141 The capacity for democratic citizens to combine and
deliberate upon their perspectives to attain civil freedom and practice self-government
constitutes democratic virtue. Yet such virtue may dissipate as digital amour-propre encourages
the presentation of status-driven appearances in our relationships with others.
Against the backdrop of this increase in other-directed character, journalist David
Goodhart frames a contemporary character struggle between anywheres, who aim to eschew any
particular social or geographical grounding for the sake of personal freedom and success, and
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somewheres, who wish to maintain strong attachments to geographical identity, family, and rural
customs.142 He interprets recent populist surges in support of Brexit and Trump as expressions of
a reactionary desire to remain rooted in a sense of place that the bourgeois double man tries to
transcend. Recent populist movements indicate a backlash against the anywheres, whom the
somewheres perceive as establishment globalist elites whose pandering and condescension stem
from their bourgeois c haracter, “always appearing to relate everything to others and never
relating anything except to themselves alone.”143
Riesman realizes that political tension between somewheres and anywheres is a part of
the transition to an increasingly other-directed society. Nevertheless, he predicts that
other-directed character will eventually subsume the struggle between somewheres and
anywheres. While Riesman notes that “there are millions of inner-directed Americans who
reject… the values that emanate from the growing dominance of other-directed types,” such
inner-directed somewheres “do not feel secure—the weight of the urban world outside is against
them—and their resentment hardens until these residual inner-directed persons are scarcely more
than caricatures…”144
Harari analyzes the insecurity of the somewheres from yet another angle. He notes that
the politics of the twenty-first century arise in a social environment where “the masses fear
irrelevance.”145 “In 1938,” Harari writes, “the common man’s condition in the Soviet Union,
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Germany, or the United States may have been grim, but he was constantly told that he was the
most important thing in the world.”146 In contrast, today “lots of mysterious terms are bandied
about excitedly in TED Talks, at government think tanks, and at high-tech
conferences—globalization, blockchain, genetic engineering, AI, machine learning—
 and
common people, both men and women, may well suspect that none of these terms is about
them.”147
These accounts converge on the central political tension that the corruption of
amour-propre has brought to the surface in the Digital Age. An increase in social visibility
relative to intimate connection has caused our drive for recognition to escalate in a digital form
of social surveillance that is both symbolized by the “phantom of a public opinion” and devised
by Big Tech companies.148 Simultaneously, the fear of irrelevance grows for democratic
individuals. Amidst the temptation to reflect everything to their self-image, they may fail to
exercise civil freedom to direct their interests “toward a whole of which one is a part” in order to
be “bound in a tight manner to something that is placed outside of them.”149 While the greater
breadth of our social performances precipitates more outlets for status obsession and narcissism,
our connective capacity renders larger the social whole of which we do not feel we are a part.
Although they advocate attachment to a sense of place, family, and traditional values,
somewheres increasingly operate through digital mediums that are profoundly other-directed.
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The unique promise of the digital realm in which we appear yet do not inhabit is that anyone can
be an anywhere. Thus, the same bourgeois character that somewheres resist, that divorces being
from appearing, and that prioritizes prideful self-awareness above collective well-being may
come to cloud the very civic space in which somewheres and anywheres can engage in political
discourse.
I have now examined the increased drive for recognition that double men may chase in
the Digital Age. In the following chapter, I turn to the current circumstances under which
bourgeois individuals may, as Rousseau writes, fail to “relate anything except to themselves
alone.”150
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Chapter Four
Individualism through Personalization

Tocqueville presents individualism as the danger that may bring bourgeois c haracter to
democracy and continue to impede the realization of political freedom. Tocqueville claims that
“individualism is of democratic origin.”151 Its emergence is especially likely when, “in
democratic centuries… the bond of human affections is extended and loosened,”152 yet disruption
of familial and religious traditions has encouraged short-term interests such that “you easily
forget those who have preceded you, and you have no idea of those who will follow you.”153
Individualism erodes our sense of social solidarity, as it “at first dries up only the source of
public virtues; but in the long term it attacks and destroys all the others and will finally be
absorbed in selfishness.”154
The final point of selfishness at which the adverse effects of individualism fully seep into
democratic mores mirrors Rousseau’s conception of the bourgeois c haracter that aggravated
amour-propre creates. Tocqueville describes selfishness as “a passionate and exaggerated love of
self that brings man to relate everything to himself alone.”155
In its initial stages, however, individualism appears as a harmless product of political
empowerment. The promise of political equality emboldens individuals to search internally for
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their political opinions, as conventional hierarchies and institutions lose their political authority.
In the absence of self-interest well understood, this internal search for opinions never utilizes
meritocratic order outside the self and fashions equality into individualism.156 Accordingly, in the
wake of rapid democratization, as we see in the current state of digital political news and
publishing power, Tocqueville predicts “an innumerable crowd of like and equal men who
revolve on themselves without repose, procuring the small and vulgar pleasures with which they
fill their souls.”157
In this context, individualism begins as at least a convenience and at most a luxury.
Individualism represents freedom and self-sufficiency. Thus, it is “a reflective and peaceable
sentiment that disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of those like him.”158 But in
the long run, such withdrawal decreases our capacity to attain the civil freedom and self-interest
well understood that comprise the project of self-government.
In the Digital Age, individualism misleadingly adopts the benign name of
personalization. Personalization technology not only responds to our personal preferences but
can also corrode personal connections built on common culture. The personalization economy
arises as a consequence of ubiquitous surveillance and data collection. As companies target us
with particular information and advertisements based on our personal data, our digital education
increasingly occurs in individual chambers of reflection that mirror our preconceived biases and
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online social segregation. The resultant media fragmentation and political polarization may thus
weaken the associative potential of digital media.
As Silverman writes, “a key element of the new digital ideology is that everything can be
personalized and made social.”159 Yet in practice, these two aims are often contradictory. Their
tension is particularly evident when we consider the personalization of political news. In the
Digital Age, the distribution of hyper-targeted and passion-driven news often overwhelms
informative appeals to the general public. Consequently, our political discourse can divide into
factions that, through digital self-selection and Big Tech’s sorting of users into narrow ad market
bases, function as ideological echo-chambers. Filter bubbles through which people Google the
same things yet get different results, particularized news feeds that trigger users based on
previously collected data, and increased ideological social segregation may fracture the common
understanding that supports the general will.

News Targeting and the Rise of the Attention Economy
As philosopher Lee McIntyre argues, the decline of broadly trusted sources of news bears
partial responsibility for such division. Until the end of the twentieth century, McIntyre notes,
“news divisions… were not expected to make any money.”160 This also helped early TV news
cultivate a trustworthy image because, as journalist Ted Koppel explains, “network executives
were afraid that a failure to work in the ‘public interest, convenience and necessity,’ as set forth
in the Radio Act of 1927, might cause the Federal Communications Commission to suspend or
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even revoke their licenses.”161 When television news was limited to a mere half-hour nationwide
broadcast, McIntyre recalls, “Walter Cronkite sat at the big desk at CBS from 1962 to 1981 and
was often cited as ‘the most trusted man in America.’”162
In 1968, 60 Minutes became “the first news show in history to turn a profit.”163 Later, in
1980, CNN began the twenty-four hour news cycle, and in 1996, deliberately partisan TV news
took off with Fox News and MSNBC.164 Today, the trend continues as different news outlets
cater to particular political persuasions by targeting increasingly ideologically narrow bases.
Such sources can make more money by responding to the specific desires of niche readerships
than by appealing to broad audiences. But the personalization of news may then push us closer to
a kind of Tocquevillian individualism in which “each man seeks his beliefs in himself,” or at
least in a news environment designed to be an extension of himself.165
Amidst an informational upheaval in which we are swept up into silos of spin that we
may not even realize we are in or may not want to get out of, our trust in news has declined. As
McIntyre notes, “Americans’ trust in the mass media has now sunk to a new low: from a high of
72 percent in 1976 in the immediate aftermath of the Watergate crisis and Vietnam, it has now
dropped to 32 percent.”166 Whether connected by causation or correlation, the dual trends of
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news personalization and declining trust in common sources of news have at least exacerbated
individualism and damaged political discourse as a “source of public virtues.”167
Furthermore, the insular news environment of the Digital Age may compromise the
virtue of journalism itself. George Orwell writes that “journalism is printing what someone else
does not want printed: everything else is public relations.”168 On this account, personalization
technology has undermined journalism, as digital media outlets aim at the attention of particular
political bases. Accordingly, much of the solidification of our ideological echo-chambers occurs
subconsciously through psychological triggers in the digital news environment that prioritize
immediate attraction over reasoned reflection.
Tocqueville argues that the gratification of individuals’ short-term desires at the expense
of their aspiration to be “bound in a tight manner to something that is placed outside of them”
reduces their capacity for political freedom. Correspondingly, Tocqueville declares that “the
habit of inattention ought to be considered the greatest vice of the democratic mind.”169 Yet it is
exactly this habit that the attention economy (which treats attention as a scarce commodity)
encourages in the Digital Age.
Tocqueville considers more specifically the kind of information that democrats will seek
in the future. He warns that the intellectual exercise of attempting to understand different and
challenging views will become less attractive. The humility of individuals in deference to
traditional institutions that foster self-interest well understood may evaporate. Tocqueville claims
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that American individuals, “as they see that they manage to resolve unaided all the little
difficulties that practical life presents,” may “easily conclude that everything in the world is
explicable and that nothing exceeds the bounds of intelligence.”170Accordingly, they may
increasingly look to general ideas and submit to the pressures of public opinion for their views.
The Digital Age perhaps instills a greater hubris in individuals who believe, or news
outlets who write, that they can distill sophisticated issues to catchy headlines. The rapid creation
and short-lived relevance of different stories that cross our news feed due to our constant state of
digital connection may reduce our propensity to reflect and doubt further, as old information is
continually submerged by a constant stream of breaking news. The result is a potential
aggravation of the debilitating effects of the press that Tocqueville traces in his visit to America.
Tocqueville observes that in an informational environment without trusted hierarchies,
doubt can inflame instinctual attachment to the news that we want to believe. He writes that
“when freedom of press finds men in the first state [of doubt], for a long time it still leaves them
in the habit of believing firmly without reflecting; it only changes the object of their unreflective
beliefs daily.”171 Tocqueville observes that the decentralization of the American press encourages
individuals to assent to information that reflects their own biases and instincts rather than a
higher sense of truth and fairness. Because appearances are easier to market than empathic
understanding is, news, particularly in today’s attention economy, made to appeal to specific
ideological groups often spews stories that promote democratic envy and prideful self-awareness.
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For Tocqueville, democratic journalism takes on its own character. He writes, “the
periodical press appears to me to have its own instincts and passions independent of the
circumstances amidst which it acts.”172 “The spirit of the journalist,” political philosopher Harvey
Mansfield claims of Tocqueville’s view, “in America by contrast to France, where he has more
power, is one of coarse attack, appeal to passion, avoidance of principle, and scandalous
revelations.”173
Tocqueville notes the “dividing strength of the press” in the United States—a condition
in which journalists “hardly have an elevated position.”174 As a result, journalists’ “education is
only sketchy, and the turn of their ideas is often vulgar.”175 Their journalistic spirit prompts them
to “attack coarsely, without preparation and without art, the passions of those whom it addresses,
to set aside principles in order to grab men,” and “to follow them into their private lives.”176 Such
superficial and incendiary news, Tocqueville declares, amounts to “an abuse of thought.”177
The shifts in American political news after Tocqueville’s death further sharpen his
critique, as the few redeeming qualities he did attribute to journalism in America apply less to
political news in the Digital Age. Despite his critique of journalistic spirit in America,
Tocqueville maintains that the value of newspapers and associations as safeguards against
individualism is intertwined, as he identifies “a necessary relation between associations and
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newspapers: newspapers make associations, and associations make newspapers.”178 But news
today reaches people in a far more decentralized and targeted way that accords with the personal
data rather than the common values of consumers. Correspondingly, the tendency of associations
to make an impression on the majority, and the ability of newspapers to facilitate unity among
disparate individuals, has diminished. One may well wonder how effectively newspapers can
now play the role that Tocqueville assigns them:
It often happens in democratic countries… that many men who have the desire or the
need to associate cannot do it…. Up comes a newspaper that exposes to their view the
sentiment or the idea that had been presented to each of them simultaneously but
separately. All are immediately directed toward that light, and those wandering spirits
who had long sought each other in the shadows finally meet each other and unite.179
Tocqueville claims that “the newspaper represents the association” because “one can say
it [the newspaper] speaks to each of its readers in the name of all the others.”180 But the same
relationship between news outlets and their readerships does not hold in the Digital Age.
Digitally mediated news sources speak to their particular ideological bases. And even sources
that attempt to provide unbiased news for broad audiences largely reach readers according to
algorithms of mediums like Google and Facebook that match news with users based on what
their particular data determines they will be most immediately attracted to. Accordingly, our
digital civic space may increasingly appeal to passion and incentivize ideological
echo-chambers.
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Even if the value that Tocqueville locates in journalism in America has dissipated, his
diagnosis of the deficiencies of our democratized media environment rings all the more true
today. The floodgates to informational abundance have opened, washing over us a constant
change in unreflective beliefs. Silverman observes that in the Digital Age “we can read
practically any newspaper in the world online, and that is a wonderful thing... while we can read
far more broadly than ever before, though, we don’t engage as deeply: 55 percent of Web users
spend less than fifteen seconds on a page.”181 With so much information available and delivered
to us according to our personal data, stories serve as “small and vulgar pleasures” that
accommodate our most basic instinctual attachments. As Silverman notes, “with so much choice,
publishers find themselves cultivating audiences that might never have to hear a political opinion
with which they don’t agree.”182 The accumulation of these factors encourages the creation and
distribution of what Silverman calls “churnalism—cheap, disposable content repurposed from
press releases, news reports, viral media, social networks, and elsewhere, all of it practically
out-of-date and irrelevant as soon as someone clicks Publish,” creating “a page view fueled horse
race.”183
The tendency of publishers to pump out content that appeases our most superficial and
individualistic instincts clouds civic space and democratic discussion with noxious divisiveness
rather than conciliatory civil freedom and rational understanding. The drive to be first on a story,
to expose a political foe, or to cancel a public figure often outweighs journalists’ consideration of
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those who think differently than they do. Silverman quotes journalist Alice Gregory, who
comments on the incentives of modern writers to construct chambers of reflection rather than
windows of insight into opposing views:
“We adore being targeted by art. We love getting nailed. Among those who write for a
living, ‘nailing it’ is one of the most succinct and meaningful compliments. Implicit in
the idiom is conclusiveness: nailing it shut. The phrase also usually implies a gimlet eye,
the ability to articulate the ineffably obvious. As readers, we’ve grown addicted to it.”
Gregory was commenting on art that flatters certain specific, often culturally influential
demographics…. The problem with “thisness,” or being targeted, is that “it’s
intellectually disingenuous to allow that recognition to masquerade as some higher order
of feeling. Owing to the rise in niche media, specificity—of language, of dress, of eating
habits—is taking the place of narrative empathy. People love thinking about themselves,
and getting someone to like something—or to ‘like’ something—seldom requires much
more than giving them the chance to celebrate their own personal history.”184
The culture of “nailing it” and the minimization of the length, sophistication, and
narrative empathy of news in the Digital Age may have wide-ranging effects that leave us
dissatisfied and disconnected. And even if one tunes out of social media and the Internet, one is
not immune from the secondary cultural effects of this new media landscape. Regardless of
individuals’ voluntary engagement on Big Tech platforms, their personal data is likely to be
collected and used to personalize their news according to psychological triggers that appeal to
their particular passions. The pervasiveness of Big Tech’s extractive mechanisms—most notably,
the platforms of Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft—makes political news ad targeting
nearly impossible to avoid.
The problem is systemic. As journalist David Roberts remarks, “as soon as you’re
ad-based, attention is your currency,” and as a result, “you’re not trying to improve your
customers’ lives.”185 Furthermore, as Silverman extrapolates, “this model recurs throughout the
184
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history of mass media, from radio to TV to the Internet,” but “now it’s woven into the very fabric
of our informational economy and our identities to boot.”186
Such cultural absorption encourages self-inflicted informational ills. Individuals are
empowered yet seem to exercise their power in ways that increasingly appeal to superficial
desires and produce incendiary reactions. Information that we transmit through digital means
most often manifests itself in images, brief videos, and short comments that trigger impulses of
strong approval or disapproval rather than sophisticated reflection. Personalized data feeds
appeal to pride, as news filters to what is most likely to elicit strong immediate reactions rather
than the thought-provoking content that might not incite our attention as quickly. Digital
discourse thus often adopts a tone of outrage and insecurity. Although harmful to our well-being,
these emotions are helpful for the generation of profits for Big Tech companies such as Google
and Facebook. Outrage and insecurity capture our attention and generate views, but they are less
likely to promote self-government by encouraging civil freedom or directing us toward
self-interest well understood.
The entrancing effect of our dysfunctional digital political discourse perhaps produces a
situation in which the other-directed individual is, as Riesman writes, “unable to know what he
wants while being preoccupied with what he likes.”187 Riesman explains that “just as glamor in
sex substitutes for both love and… family ties… and just as glamor in packaging and advertising
of products substitutes for price competition, so glamor in politics… as the hopped-up treatment
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of events by the mass media, substitutes for the types of self-interest that governed the
inner-directed.”188
Surface-level attraction to news substitutes for our deeper understanding and utilization
of it to establish connections and values that encourage self-government. Awestruck by the
glamor of status-signaling and personalization technology, we risk withdrawing into subjects of
Tocquevillian democratic despotism, whose passivity is most often disturbed by the instinctual
reaction of anger when those with opposing views distract us from our self-image.
To avoid such subconsciously instigated division, we ought to heed Riesman’s warning
that “wherever we see glamor in the object of attention, we must suspect a basic apathy in the
spectator.”189 Otherwise we risk falling into Tocquevillian democratic despotism, as “subjection
in small affairs manifests itself every day and makes itself felt without distinction by all
citizens,” and “does not make them desperate; but it constantly thwarts them and brings them to
renounce the use of their wills.”190
Today, the democratized state of political news has created an individualistic, atomized,
and emotionally charged digital news environment in which Tocqueville’s declaration that “a
false idea, but one clear and precise, will always have more power in the world than a true, but
complex, idea,” holds especially true.191 The bourgeois character of the literalized double man
and rise of individualism in the Digital Age have increased appeals to passion in our news that
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risk dividing and debilitating our democracy despite the enormous transcendent potential of
modern technology.

From Personalization to Political Polarization
When our understanding of the outside world is determined by news filtered according to
our personal data and self-selection of material we already agree with, political polarization may
increase. For our perception of truth quite literally polarizes, as we see the world through
different narrative lenses depending on our online activity. And unlike in the natural world, in
the digital world we can simply filter out those with whom we disagree. As McIntyre explains,
“these days we have the luxury of choosing our own selective interactions”; “whatever our
political persuasion, we can live in a ‘news silo’ if we care to.”192And more often than not, “we
just feel more comfortable when our views are in step with those of our compatriots.”193
The convenience that the attention economy’s combination of inflamed amour-propre
and individualism generates may align with the self-interest of many individuals. The attention
economy works well to keep us in comfortable information bubbles, satisfy our short-term
desires, and promote the profits of Big Tech companies. Additionally, the superficiality and
individualism of the Internet present opportunities for those willing to take advantage of the
all-the-more-truism: “the media loves controversy more than truth.”194 As Silverman notes,
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“celebrities know that even an unplanned, perhaps regrettable Twitter outburst will lead to useful
media coverage.”195
Despite the allure of attention and comfort of ideological affirmation, we have reason to
consider Koppel's statement that while he “can appreciate the financial logic of drowning…
viewers in a flood of opinions designed to confirm their own biases, the trend is not good for the
republic.”196 Amidst all of our attention-seeking and individualistic polarization, we risk
absorbing ourselves in distraction from the democratic role of individuals to exercise our civil
freedom and hold those in power accountable to the general will. Tocqueville warns that “if each
citizen, as he becomes individually weaker and consequently more incapable in isolation of
preserving his freedom, does not learn the art of uniting with those like him to defend it, tyranny
will necessarily grow with equality.”197 For, as the division of labor becomes more stark and we
become more dependent on each other to perform basic functions, our interpersonal detachment
grows more costly. If “in centuries of equality, each man seeks his beliefs in himself” alone, then
individuals will prevent themselves from realizing self-interest well understood.198
Democracies in the Digital Age may be uniquely susceptible to the kind of democratic
despotism Tocqueville warns of. The transition from commonly trusted sources of news to the
democratization of publishing power and personalization of information has generated conditions
conducive to a surge in individualism that threatens to consume the civic space in which
open-minded deliberation and civil freedom can flourish. Such circumstances render timely
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Tocqueville’s warning that “a despot readily pardons the governed for not loving him, provided
that they do not love each other.”199
But the threat of the Tocquevillian immaterial despotism of public opinion may be a more
fundamental danger to self-government than is the rise of a particular despot. For the former
creates the conditions in which the latter may flourish. And the “phantom of a public opinion”
also exerts its own method of coercion.200 As Riesman writes, in other-directed society one “must
have acceptable opinions, and where he engages in politics he must do so in acceptable ways.”201
The social requirements that the Digital Age dictates mirror Tocqueville’s warning of the
particular pervasiveness of immaterial despotism in democratic republics. “A king,” he writes,
“has only a material power that acts on actions and cannot reach wills; but the majority is vested
with a force, at once material and moral, that acts on the will as much as on actions, and which at
the same time prevents the deed and the desire to do it.”202

The Decline of Informational Authority and Social Cohesion
The Digital Age has actualized the force of this democratic despotism in the algorithms
that now guide our digital deeds and desires. The coercive pressure of group-think and social
restrictions of cancel culture not only affect writers who, as Packer observes, “are now expected
to identify with a community and to write as its representatives,” but also extend to sway the
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political expression and social circles of all kinds of individuals in digital society.203 Political
opinions increasingly function as a form of group conformity, as, in digital society, they
determine our social environment rather than vice versa. Accordingly, our digital social settings
do little to expose us to intellectual authorities who provide one with more than insular
entrenchment in one’s biases.
Tocqueville warns that, in democracy, a rise of individualism may prevent individuals
from expanding their views beyond themselves. Self-interest well understood is under threat in
such circumstances, as, according to Manent, “it is this idea, the very matrix of the influence that
one man has over another—whether it be that of ‘reason or virtue’—that is here destroyed.”204
Individuals rely on their inner judgment rather than on the competence of traditional institutions.
And their parochial views leave room for only a cursory consideration of the general ideas with
which the impersonal “phantom of a public opinion” pressures them.205
The digital media environment presents individuals with news that caters to their narrow
perspectives. The power of opinion that we fall under is thus less majority opinion than it is the
overwhelming opinions of particular factions. This deviation from Tocqueville’s diagnosis
further fractures our capacity to understand each other and exercise wide-ranging civil freedom,
as digital political news decreasingly highlights our shared values and increasingly reinforces our
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disparate biases. Consequently, it becomes harder to accomplish Rousseau’s goal of, as Manent
writes, “identifying each individual with the polity itself.”206
The potential deficiencies of the digital news media environment may not have surprised
Tocqueville, for, as Manent interprets Tocqueville’s view, “free associations themselves, with
time, tend to be unfaithful to their democratic foundation.”207 Tocqueville encourages us to
maintain our awareness of the threats to political freedom that exist deeply embedded in
democratic ideology, waiting to undermine their maker through its historical enactment. Today,
we recognize the danger that personalization technology may shape the passion for equality into
the individualistic polarization of our media environment.
In the Digital Age, the decline in institutional trust and social understanding that
accompanies aggravated amour-propre a nd individualism threatens to throw democracy into
digital disorder. Perhaps this movement is merely a continuation of a tension that Tocqueville
locates between those who, swept up by democratic dogmas, view forms, institutions, and
traditions as obstacles to equality, and those who, like Tocqueville, regard such instruments as
necessary for the promotion of virtue. “Democratic peoples,” Mansfield writes, “disdain forms
because they want to go directly to the object of their desires, preferring action to dignity,
sincerity to politeness, result to correctness; in sum, substance to form.”208 Tocqueville, in
contrast, argues that institutions are necessary to “place obstacles between men and their desires”
and construct some sort of hierarchy of competence that encourages the better angels of our
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nature.209 Such hierarchies need not always favor the few at the expense of the many, but rather,
when applied to issues such as the reliability of news, can work in service of the self-interest of
all.
But distrust in traditional institutions has now extended to forms of mass media that
previously provided hierarchies of competence upholding common principles. At its height, trust
in journalistic institutions served as a countervailing force to check the corruption of
government, but today, many people perceive neither government nor the media as a reliable
source for truth. In addition to the aforementioned declining trust in mass media, trust in
government and our fellow citizens appears to be diminishing. Pew Research Center finds that
75% of Americans believe that trust in the federal government has been shrinking.210 And Our
World in Data finds that interpersonal trust among Americans is at 30 percent, down from 50
percent in 1985.211 As Zuboff notes, “social trust is highly correlated with peaceful collective
decision making and civic engagement.”212 “In its absence,” she continues, “the authority of
shared values and mutual obligations slips away.”213 Regardless of the extent to which one can
attribute decline in trust to the technological developments of the Digital Age, such decrease in
assurance renders us more vulnerable to a tide of alienation from political freedom.
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The danger of such distrust is at once public detachment and political rebellion. Many
citizens grow disgusted with the superficiality of political news and sever themselves from the
political process. They reject the bourgeois character of political posturing. As Lasch writes, “the
‘flight from politics,’ as it appears to the managerial and political elite, may signify the citizen’s
growing unwillingness to take part in the political system as a consumer of prefabricated
spectacles.”214
While Lasch notes that the “pervasive distrust of those in power” underlying the modern
individual’s skepticism of institutions “has made society increasingly difficult to govern,” it also
changes the mode of governing.215 For individualism, as Tocqueville claims, “at first dries up
only the source of public virtues; but in the long term it attacks and destroys all the others [all the
other virtues] and will finally be absorbed in selfishness.”216 The increasing individualism and
factionalization of the public not only produces apathy but also prompts inflammatory political
character. Those who feel they are politically alienated will lash out, as Lasch predicts when he
suggests that the “flight from politics” may be “not a retreat from politics at all but the
beginnings of a general political revolt.”217 His message mirrors the writings of Riesman, who
predicts that “if at any time the indignants can make a junction with the indifferents, the former
can become very powerful,” as “indignation can draw on great lower-class reserves of
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nationalism and xenophobia.”218 One need only observe our current political situation to see this
frustration uncovered.
As we have investigated how Rousseau’s account of the corruption of self-love and
Tocqueville’s description of withdrawal into individualism apply to our present state, we may
now characterize the particular threat to political freedom that the Digital Age presents.
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Conclusion
Digital Tribalism and the Automation of Self-Growth

The application of the theories of Rousseau and Tocqueville to current technological
trends reveals the danger to political freedom as an advanced state of nature that nevertheless
leaves its members underdeveloped. Relationships in Rousseau’s ideal state of nature are
intimate yet few as individuals embrace both political freedom and environmental constraints.
The digital state of nature, in contrast, encourages us to instrumentalize others and removes us
from the forces for self-growth in the natural world. It encourages prideful recession into
particularized digital environments that increase individualism rather than allow us to gain
greater understanding of others and exercise our civil freedom. This development produces an
extension of Manent’s depiction of the central threat that Tocqueville identifies: a “radical
severing of the social links that democracy introduces” that “opens us to the image of democracy
as a ‘dis-society.’”219 In the Digital Age, this dis-society constitutes a condition of digital
tribalism.
Digital tribalism may arise from the combination of the corruption of self-love and
exacerbation of individualism. Recall the particular social superficiality of the Rousseauian man:
the bourgeois c haracter appears to relate everything to others while in fact relating everything to
himself. In digital dis-society, Rousseau’s double man tends to display his individualism as a
form of prideful self-awareness of and self-indulgence in his particular views. Consequently, we
see the rise of cancel culture, virtue signaling, de-platforming, absolutism, and misrepresentative
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sound bites, videos, and tweets. These maneuvers serve as efforts to reshape the political
landscape in one’s own image. Such action signals one’s bias or sensitivity as a source of pride
that must be honored by others rather than inducing a well of reasoned reflection that connects us
to the interests of others. Increasingly, our technology may produce prideful displays of the
political opinions that arise from individualism instead of attempts to fulfill one’s capacity to
orient oneself “toward a whole of which one is a part” and become “bound in a tight manner to
something that is placed outside of” oneself.220 This pivot marks a shift away from the exercise
of civil freedom and the apprehension of self-interest well understood that mark true political
freedom.
In digital society, individuals exert their natural freedom through their ability to access
and publish information without having to answer to a master. Yet such technological liberation
can surreptitiously—as Rousseau writes of Enlightenment developments—“spread garlands of
flowers over the iron chains with which men are burdened.”221 Citizens face subliminal
disenfranchisement from civil freedom through the influence of bourgeois character and
individualism—character shifts which spread more deliberately due to the incentives of Big Tech
companies that compete in the attention economy. Our propensity for self-government may thus
dissolve as our capacity for association and self-interest well understood diminishes.
Social superficiality and political polarization may divide our common interests and
depoliticize the democratic individual. Here, democracy risks reaching a point of contradiction,
for, as Mansfield and Delba Winthrop, fellow editor of Democracy in America,  explain:
Rousseau, “On the Social Contract, ” in Major Political Writings, 174; Tocqueville, Democracy in
America, 483.
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One might even say that the democratic social state seems to dissociate men so that they
pass quickly from subjects to citizens to individuals. The social state in its completion is
really an asocial state of sovereign individuals, each of them capable, according to the
democratic dogma, of running his own life—while in truth, as one in a mass, powerless to
do so.222
Tocqueville foresees that the progression of democracy may eventually untie the bonds of
the social contract. The dogma of the sovereignty of the people, in its excess, decomposes
hierarchies and associations into individuals who, in their chambers of reflection, look out their
windows (or at their screens) only to feel the power of opinion—the amorphous audience of
society at large —reflect back to them their own prideful self-awareness. The aim of
self-sufficiency and equal political representation can, then, rob us of our capacity for
self-government, which can only be cultivated through the intimate relations with others and
engagement with reasoned reflection that encourage our self-interest well understood.
Tocqueville’s vision of democratic collapse is through a progress of equality that debases us, as
we simultaneously advance and return to an antisocial state of nature—a condition that, in digital
society, is exemplified by digital tribalism.
We see forms of such digital debasement when, while technology evolves, the
prerequisites to political freedom recede. Consider, for example, the regression of intimate
connection and reasoned reflection in political discourse from the fireside chats of nearly a
century ago to the tweets of today. The informational overload and digital format of today’s
news encourage the spreading of ever smaller bits of information that merely signal allegiance
rather than engage others—that aim to insult others rather than promote understanding. For the
sake of our transcendent reach and efficient communication, it may be more politically
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advantageous to sacrifice depth for breadth in our communications and leave untapped the
technological potential to engage beyond the status-driven instrumentation of others.
But this development may be a mere symptom of the deeper, underlying affront on our
political freedom: the increase of informational asymmetry between ordinary individuals whose
social education shapes their capacity for self-government and those who govern digital society
itself. Our modern dependence on digital technology and those few companies that establish the
terms for our discourse on it presents the possibility of a decline in the political freedom of
democratic individuals. Tocqueville writes that “it is easy to foresee that the time is approaching
when a man by himself alone will be less and less in a state to produce the things that are the
most common and the most necessary to his life.”223 Today, through our declining ability to
understand the technological forces that govern our lives, we have progressed quite far along the
lines of Tocqueville’s prediction. Consider the role of the digital technology user as analogous to
that of the modern consumer, who, as philosopher Julien Freund writes, “buys any number of
products in the grocery without knowing what substances they are made of… by contrast,
‘primitive’ man in the bush knows infinitely more about the conditions under which he lives.”224
In the digital news landscape, individuals have particular stores in which they can feed
their informational appetite for free. Each store has different products specifically tailored to
each individual’s tastes—or distastes, as in the news world (unlike, for the most part, in the
realm of food) we may be drawn to pick up and ridicule those pieces that we find most revolting.
Occasionally we choose to change aisles, but we seldom switch stores and see how someone
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with different tastes shops. Most remain entranced by the infinite flow of goods pumping into
their feeds. Our need for sustenance, as well as our cravings for those items that may be worst for
us, keeps us coming back to our personalized digital marketplaces. In so doing, the exercise of
our freedom merely amounts to our willingness to be filled by those who we assume know more
about our preferences than we do.
At the heart of our dependence on digital news media lies an asymmetry of information,
yet because of either inconvenience or absent-mindedness, we rarely question this imbalance. As
Zuboff notes, “surveillance capitalists know everything about us, whereas their operations are
designed to be unknowable to us. ”225 But many hardly notice. The data extraction model of Big
Tech and its effects on our discourse are so vast—so integrated into everyday life—that their
existence seems inevitable. Zuboff addresses the problem further:
Consider that the internet has become essential for social participation, that the internet is
now saturated with commerce, and that commerce is now subordinated to surveillance
capitalism. Our dependency is at the heart of the commercial surveillance project, in
which our felt needs for effective life vie against the inclination to resist its bold
incursions. This conflict produces a psychic numbing that inures us to the realities of
being tracked, parsed, mined and modified.226
The final form of this integration is the automation of our actions, which stands opposite
our rational agency to self-correct, self-govern, and fulfill our deeply natural purpose to strive to
become more than we are today—to grow and flourish. In the 1991 article “The Computer for
the 21st Century,” computer scientist Mark Weisner writes that “the most profound technologies
are those that disappear,” as “they weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they
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are indistinguishable from it.”227 We are living through the increasing realization of his
prediction as the ubiquity of digital technology in our modern lives grows more “natural”. While
some may be wary of this shift, others view this development as the future we ought to aspire to.
As Zuboff recalls:
Eric Schmidt [former CEO of Google and current chairman of the US Department of
Defense's Defense Innovation Advisory Board] provoked uproar in 2015 when in
response to a question on the future of the web, he said, “The internet will disappear.”
What he really meant was that “The internet will disappear into Big Other.”... In an
instrumentarian utopia, Big Other simulates the vortex of stimuli, transforming “natural
selection” into the “unnatural selection” of variation and reinforcement authored by
market players and the competition for surveillance revenues.228
Promotion of social superficiality and individualism lie at the core of the Big Other’s
control, for as Zuboff details, for surveillance capitalists, “friction is the only evil.”229 She
elaborates:
Instrumentarian power, like Goethe’s Faust, is morally agnostic. The only moral
imperative here is distilled from the point of view of a thin utopian gruel. If there is a sin,
it is the sin of autonomy: the audacity to reject the flows that herd us all toward
predictability… The norm is submission to the supposed iron laws of technological
inevitability that brook no impediment. It is deemed only rational to surrender and rejoice
in new conveniences and harmonies, to wrap ourselves in the first text and embrace a
violent ignorance of its shadow.230
What Zuboff reveals here is hardly a secret; Silicon Valley leaders themselves suggest
similar conclusions. Mark Zuckerberg often refers to “frictionless sharing”—his “term for
sharing that is swift, simple, and automatic.”231 As writer Adrian Short claims, this phrase “is
Mark Weiser, “The Computer for the 21st Century,” Scientific American, September 1991,
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-computer-for-the-21st-century.
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better understood as a ‘euphemism for silent total surveillance.’”232 Furthermore, Silverman
relays “Zuckerberg’s dream for Facebook,” which, Zuckerberg states, is “to make us all cells in a
single organism, communicating automatically in spite of ourselves, perhaps without the need for
intention or speech.”233
The danger of digital development toward this goal is that it may disintegrate the project
of self-government that gives our lives so much meaning. For no dominant force can automate
the importance of reflective agency and political freedom. Tocqueville writes:
A central power, however enlightened, however learned one imagines it, cannot gather to
itself alone all the details of the life of a great people. It cannot do it because such a work
exceeds human strength. When it wants by its care alone to create so many diverse
springs and make them function, it contents itself with a very incomplete result or
exhausts itself in useless efforts.234
The springs of our self-government do not emanate from a central source. Rather, they
flow through the intimate relationships we form with others, the conceptions of greatness we
strive toward, and the universal spiritual drive of individuals to be “bound in a tight manner to
something that is placed outside of them” such that they “forget themselves.”235
The particular legitimacy and beauty of democracy is that it permits us to retain our
natural fluidity. It allows us to enact the very internal self-government that encourages us to
flourish on a communal level. Manent claims that democracy’s saving consideration is its
regenerative capacity to correct for its mistakes. Although “the democratic process contains
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within it the threat of a state of nature increasingly less civilized,” Manent writes, “real
democracy never ceases establishing the state of nature in order to continually abandon it.”236 For
“to establish a state in which truly independent men would be in a position to associate while at
the same time preserving their liberties is its task—always unfinished.”237 Thus, democratic
progress oscillates between dis-society and the improvement of society.
Our understanding of how technology alters our nature is integral to the promotion of this
shift and protection of political freedom in digital society. For gaining insight into how the
corrupted self-love of the double man and the illusory independence of individualism may create
an environment of digital tribalism is the first step to awakening the civil freedom needed to
potentially reknit “the social fabric.”238
The seeds for such growth are sown in the ground of our nature and the constraints it
imposes on us. We need tension between our interests and their satisfiability to be able to assent
through our common struggle to the better angels of our nature and grow through
self-government. Perhaps this is why, as Bloom interprets, “Rousseau recognized that without
necessity the realm of freedom can have no meaning.”239
Today, this lesson is easy to forget. Faith in the emancipatory potential of technology
may tempt us to construct digital chambers of reflection and aim, in vain, to contain all our
insatiable desires in them. We may ineffectually attempt to digitally manufacture our own
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artificial and personal Edenic paradise. Or, we may use our chambers of reflection to hold
mirrors to our nature that allow us to understand and enlighten our interests. We may use our
technology to cultivate our garden.
I have extended the political theories of Rousseau and Tocqueville to the present day in
order to investigate the possibility of alienation from political freedom in the Digital Age. The
principal danger of digital society and our faith in technological progress, I have argued, is that
they may unravel our sociability into a state of digital tribalism. In such a state, one depends on
others for approval, yet one grows increasingly alienated from one’s capacity to intimately
connect with them and exercise civil freedom by orienting oneself “toward a whole of which one
is a part.”240 Personalization technology promotes a kind of individualism that casts our views of
the outside world back to our opinions and biases. Chambers of reflection comprise our civic
space and distract us from scrutinizing the very sources of democratic despotism.
But by redirecting our chambers of reflection from our own aggrandizement to the
process through which digital technology alters our nature and dissolves democracy into
dis-society, we can awaken our sense of self-government and exercise political freedom. We can
affirm our natural flourishing in digital society by reknitting the social fabric that helps us
navigate our self-interest and strive toward self-growth. For this purpose we may do well to learn
from the thinkers whose legacies persist to ensure that political freedom endures amidst the
challenges that the future holds.
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